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The importance of risk-sharing in agricultural economies has been ex-
tensively analyzed through the principal-agent framework, which predicts
that sharecropping should be observed more frequently than fixed rent con-
tracts when output uncertainty is higher. Empirical studies, however, provide
mixed support for this prediction, since often fixed rent contracts are found to
be prevalent in more risky environments. The first chapter provides a model
where the relative incidence of share tenancy over fixed rent contracts may
be negative depending, among other things, on the relative average degree of
risk aversion of tenants and landlords.
The second chapter explores the empirical validity of the theoretical
framework using Indian data. After paying special attention to the mea-
sure of uncertainty used to identify farming risk, a parameterized version
of the theoretical model is structurally estimated. The econometric results
support the proposed model.
The third chapter studies the offset effect of pension wealth on private
wealth when individuals are misinformed about their future retirement ben-
efits. We show that if individuals have expectational errors correlated with
their actual pension wealth, and update over time their expectations, then
the canonical econometric specification used so far to estimate the offset effect
gives biased estimates. An alternative econometric specification is proposed
and used to estimate the offset effect on Italian data. The estimates obtained
are higher than the ones previously found in the literature.
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Chapter 1
Sharecropping and Risk-Sharing
Revisited: A COlllpetitive
Approach to Contract Choice
1.1 Introduction
Fanning activity is usually performed under three different arrangements. Under a wage
contract a landowner hires a tenant to work under his direction; the tenant is paid a wage
rate and the landlord keeps the entire output. Under a fixed rent contract the tenant
manages farming activity directly, keeps all output, and pays a rent to the landlord for the
use of the plot. Under a share tenancy contract the tenant farms the plot but keeps only a
portion of the final output, the remaining output going to the landlord as payment for the
land use. l
In the last two decades several attempts have been made to explain the determinants of
contract choice and the rationale for the widespread practise of share tenancy in agrarian
economies. Many studies take as a starting point that farming activity is intrinsically
lThe literature usually refers to the tiller hired under the wage contract as a wage laborer, while it
uses the term tenant in case of sharecropping and fixed rent contracts. To simplify we always refer to the
contracting parties as tenant and landlord, regardless of the land contract. In the following the terms share
tenancy and sharecropping are also used interchangeably.
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risky and that a moral hazard problem may arise as the tenant may shirk effort, if not
monitored. The effect of uncertainty on contract choice is then studied using the Principal-
Agent framework, that embeds a trade-off between incentive provision and insurance by
the landlord (principal) for the tenant (agent). This set up predicts that, as the exogenous
uncertainty related to farming increases, the risk-sharing motive dominates the incentive
one, and share tenancy should be observed more frequently than fixed rent contracts, as
the former partially insures the tenant.
Some predictions of the Principal-Agent framework are, however, at odds with empirical
evidence. First, there is mixed support for its predictions regarding the effect of farming
risk on contract choice. A few studies have found a negative empirical relation between
crop risk and the incidence of sharecropping (Rao, 1971; Allen and Lueck, 1999), while
in others share tenancy seems indeed to be associated with riskier crops (Ackerberg and
Botticini, 2000). A crucial problem affecting these empirical studies is that they use the
crop cultivated on the plot to proxy for farming risk. The theoretical predictions, however,
concern the relation between incidence of share tenancy and exogenous farming risk, i.e.
uncertainty that cannot be affected by the agent's actions, while the crop cultivated may be
chosen by the landlord or tenant. In Chapter 2 we analyze further this issue and propose a
different measure of farming risk unrelated to the specific crop cultivated. Second, in agency
theory typically the agent has no bargaining power in shaping the contract and determining
the contract payments. These are set by the principal to maximize his profit, leaving the
agent at his reservation utility. When applying this framework to agrarian contracts, the
social situation economists have in mind is one where landlords and tenants are engaged
in an exploitative relation, where the tenants are usually landless, and therefore powerless.
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But such an asymmetric treatment of the economic power of landlords and tenants is not
always realistic. Casual evidence on a number of agrarian societies shows that their tenants
enter the agrarian contracts that best fit their needs, and that the tenant-landlord relation is
far from being exploitative. 2 Finally, in the Principal-Agent framework the type of contract
offered and the contract payments reflect the personal characteristics of the agents matched.
This implies that we should observe a variety of contract payments within the same village,
reflecting the heterogeneity in the social and economic conditions of the landlords and
tenants. Contract terms, however, display a striking uniformity within village economies.
There is overwhelming evidence showing that sharecropping contracts use the same output
and input sharing rules within regions, despite differences in land productivity and personal
characteristics of landlords and tenants. 3
These arguments raise doubts on the general attitude present in the literature, that
considers the Principal-Agent model as the valid framework to analyze all agrarian soci-
eties. As mentioned in Reid (1987), agrarian contracts are different ways to organize the
management of a farm and we should not expect one theory of management to be valid over
different periods and places. The purpose of the present paper is to propose an alternative
framework to agency theory that may be more suitable for some agrarian economies. 4 We
regard contract choice as an occupational choice. Both tenants and landlords are allowed to
choose, among a given set of contracts, the one that maximizes their utility, taking as given
the associated contractual terms (or payments). Because of heterogeneity in underlying
2See Sharma and Dreze (1996) and Jodha (1981) for India, and Burke and Young (2001) for US.
3See Burke and Young (2001) for a recent rigorous study using US data.
4 Another departure from the principal-agent framework is found in Bell and Zusmau (1976), where
contract choice is studied using a bargaining model.
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fundamentals (ability and risk aversion), agents self-select into specific contracts. Given
the nature of the contracts, tenants and landlords decide whether to assume the cultivation
risk and be "entrepreneurs", or to earn a fixed income, or to be "franchising" entrepreneurs
and share the risk. The contract payments are then determined in equilibrium so that the
choice of the landlord about which contract to offer is compatible with the preferences of
the tenant in a general equilibrium sense, i.e. the demand of each contract type equals the
supply.
In this framework, the relationship between purely exogenous risk and contract choice
in equilibrium depends then on the elasticities of the agents' choices with respect to risk,
which are functions of the agents' risk aversion. In general, an increase in farming risk
shifts tenants' preferences towards the less risky contracts for the tenants (such as wage
contract and share tenancy), while it shifts landlords' preferences in the opposite direction.
The excess supply/demand generated are cleared for a given set of equilibrium contract
payments, but the resulting distribution of contracts may entail a higher proportion of
share tenancy over fixed rent contracts, as well as a lower one.
An additional difficulty in signing comparative statics with respect to risk arises from the
fact that landlords' income under a share tenancy contract depends on the farming ability
of the tenants they are matched with in equilibrium. Evidence from India shows that
under share tenancy the tenant takes most of the farming decisions independently from
the landlords, so that the final output depends on his managerial skills. 5 In our model,
therefore, the landlords' decision of which contract to offer is affected by their expectations
5See Sharma and Dreze (1996) and Jodha (1981), where it is reported that even crop choice is left to the
tenant, along with other important practical decisions, such as when to irrigate, harvest, etc. that ultimately
affect the final output.
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on the farming ability of the pool of tenants choosing share tenancy at the market contract
rates. As higher exogenous farming risk selects more skilled. tenants into share tenancy,
such a contract becomes more attractive to the landlords with respect to the other two, as
it pays a higher average income. This effect partly runs in the opposite direction of the
pure risk effect mentioned earlier, as it increases the relative supply of share tenancy with
respect to fixed rent contracts.
Apart from being able to predict the observed relation between risk and contract choice,
the model proposed does not assume an asymmetric treatment of the bargaining power
of landlords and tenants. Instead, it allows the tenants to obtain part of the economic
rent generated by the contracts signed, due to the assumed heterogeneity in individual
characteristics and uniformity in contract payments. As in a standard demand-supply
framework, in fact, both sides of the market enjoy a surplus, excepting for the marginal
agents, who are indifferent between a pair of contracts given the equilibrium payments.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 we describe the main features
of the model and discuss the validity of some assumptions, while in section 3 we formally
present the model. Section 4 describes the properties of the demand/supply of contracts.
In section 5 we find restrictions on the set of contract payments to ensure that all markets
are active in equilibrium and in section 6 we prove the existence theorem for a competitive
equilibrium in our economy. Finally, in section 7 we use a numerical example of the model
to study the cases when a negative relation between risk and relative frequency of share
tenancy over fixed rent contracts is likely to happen. Section 8 concludes.
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1.2 The Competitive Framework: Overview of the Model
and Related Literature
In this section we outline the model and its main implications. Farming can take place
under three different contractual forms: wage contract, share tenancy contract and fixed
rent contract. Landlords and tenants consider the payments associated with each of these
contracts as given and respectively offer and look for the contract they prefer. In this sense
agents are price takers, and payments are not individual specific. Tenants' outside option
consists in wage labor in the urban sector. 6 Landlords' outside option is a non-farming
activity.
Tenants and landlords are heterogeneous in their farming (or managerial) ability so that
more skilled individuals are able to obtain higher output under those contracts where their
managerial ability counts, Le. share tenancy and fixed rent contracts for tenants and wage
contracts for landlords. Agents are also heterogeneous in their risk aversion. 7 Given such
heterogeneity in farming skills and risk aversion, tenants and landlords may have different
preferences towards the contracts for given associated payments. Tenants with high farming
ability and low risk aversion may prefer the fixed rent contract to the wage and share tenancy
contract since it allows them to keep the whole output, and therefore obtain the returns to
their skills. On the contrary, unskilled and highly risk-averse tenants will prefer the wage
contract, where their remuneration does not depend on their farming (in)ability. Similarly
6The presence of a nearby town or city ties down the wage in the agricultural sector because if the wage
was lower than the one offered in the urban sector, discounted by migration disutility, then farmers would
. prefer to abandon the villages and work in the urban sector.
7Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) also exploit the idea that the optimal contract may depend on the relative
skills of the agents in supervising and managing the land. Though the qualitative prediction is close in spirit,
the present model provides a substantially different framework, as they analyze a one-to-one principal-agent
relation.
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more skilled and/or less risk-averse landlords will prefer wage contracts. Share tenancy is
then a way to match the preferences of tenants and landlords with intermediate farming
skills and risk aversion. 8
The selection of tenants and landlords in the different contracts conditional on the wage
rate, the output share and the rent determines the demand and supply of each contract.
Market equilibrium imposes that the payments have to adjust so that the offer of a specific
contract from landlords equals the demand from tenants. For example an increase in the rent
makes the fixed rent contract more attractive for landlords compared to share tenancy and
wage contract, so that some landlords may switch, but it also makes the fixed rent contract
less attractive for tenants who might therefore prefer share tenancy or wage contract. 9
The framework outlined above has features that overcome the shortcomings of agency
theory when applied to agrarian contracts' choice. First, as in a standard demand-supply
framework, both tenants and landlords enjoy a surplus unless they are the marginal agents.
The marginal agents are, in fact, defined as the tenants and landlords who are indifferent
between a pair of contracts given the equilibrium payments, so that any agent who strictly
prefers one contract over the others, conditional on the payments, is gaining an economic
rent. This is in sharp contrast with the Principal-Agent model where the landlord gains
the entire surplus, while the tenant is left indifferent between the contract offered and his
8Note that even though the present paper moves away from agency theory, it does not ignore the central
issue of moral hazard, as landlords' farming ability may be interpreted as heterogeneity in opportunity cost
incurred by landlords while monitoring wage laborers, who would otherwise shirk effort. In the empirical
specification adopted in Chapter 2, landlords are indeed heterogeneous with respect to their monitoring
costs.
9 A similar framework could also be used to analyze housing contract choice. Home owners and hunters
decide which market to enter, i.e. whether to sell/buy or rent a house, at the prevailing ma:rket prices.
Heterogeneity in wealth, liquidity constraint and demographic characteristics whithin the two groups deter-
mines the demand and supply of houses in the two markets. Finally market prices adjust so that excess
demands/supplies are cleared.
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outside option.
Second, this set up has the potential to predict that sharecropping is less frequent
than the fixed rent contract when output risk is higher and the only driving force is risk-
sharing. When cultivation becomes riskier, the demand and supply of each contract change
according to the preferences of the agents. More specifically if tenants are risk averse,
then their demand shifts towards less risky contracts, i.e. from fixed rent to share tenancy
and from share tenancy to wage contracts. Given this, the pool of tenants choosing share
tenancy has on average higher skills, so that expected output under share tenancy increases
and compensate for the increased uncertainty. On the contrary, risk-averse landlords shifts
their preferences towards fixed rent and share tenancy contracts, but given the increased
output under share tenancy, there is an absolute increase in the supply of share tenancy.
Higher uncertainty may therefore be associated in equilibrium with a higher or lower ratio
of share tenancy to fixed rent contracts, depending on the elasticities of the relative demand
and supply with respect to risk. Such elasticities depend on the structure and the primitives
of the model, and in particular on the degree of risk aversion of landlords and tenants and
the sensitivity of output to the individuals' farming skills.
Finally, the assumption that all agents are price takers may seem questionable since
landlords offer contracts and set the contractual terms, as argued by Singh (1989). The
main point of this model, however, is that though landlords offer contracts and set the
payments, they must compete for the tenants, i.e. they have to set payments so that there
are tenants willing to accept the contract they offer at those terms. Such competitive
pressure drives to zero excess demand/supply of the different contracts. It is therefore a
long-run theory of equilibrium in the tenancy market, while it is silent about how agents
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search for the best option and how the equilibrium is reached. Price-taking behavior,
however, may indeed explain why contract payments are typically not individual-specific in
many agrarian economies. Under sharecropping contracts, output is usually split according
to a fixed proportion (half-half, one-third, or two-third are the splitting rules typically
observed), while under fixed-rent contracts the land is often rented out at a certain price per
acre, regardless of differences in land productivity and personal characteristics of landlords
and tenants, within a given economic region. The uniformity of contract terms has long
been neglected by contract theory, and only recently have there been attempts to explain it.
Young (1998) proposes a dynamic model where each contracting party forms expectations
about the contract terms the opponent will demand, based on the contracts prevailing in the
previous periods. Each party then proposes conditions likely to be accepted, as they were in
the past. This explains how some terms and conditions of specific types of agrarian contracts
are carried out over time, until they become conventions. Furthermore Young's model
predicts that conventional contracts assigning payoffs in an egalitarian way (i.e. equally
splitting the economic rent) are more stable over time as none of the contracting parties
is extremely dissatisfied. In this respect, our model differs sharply from Young's approach.
In the theory of conventional contracts, contractual terms emerge for each contract type
independently of what terms and conditions are offered for other types of contracts. For
example, to explain the emergence of customary sharing rules in sharecropping contracts,
the wage and the rent are considered as outside options and therefore exogenous. In the
present paper instead contractual terms are jointly determined for all contract types so that
each agent is satisfied.
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Note that in equilibrium landlords and tenants with complementary features are matched.
Landlords with low farming ability and high risk aversion offer wage contracts and are
matched with low skilled tenants demanding such contracts, and similarly high (intermedi-
ate) ability and low (intermediate) risk-averse landlords are matched with high (interme-
diate) ability and low (intermediate) risk-averse tenants under fixed rent contracts (share
tenancy). The positive sorting displayed in equilibrium has characteristics similar to the
sorting that arises in equalizing differential models, where workers with stronger preferences
for certain job characteristics end up matching with firms providing jobs with those features,
while wages adjust so that the demand and supply of jobs' types are equal. 10
1.3 The Model
The economy consists of two types of agents: the landlords (L) and the tenants (T). Each
landlord owns a plot of land and decides whether to manage directly farming activity on his
plot by hiring workers through wage contracts, or to rent out the land through a tenurial
contract (either a share tenancy or a fixed rent contract). We assume that landlords cannot
mix contracts, i.e. they cannot divide the plot of land in smaller subplots and choose
different contracts on each subplot. 11 Tenants do not own land, and decide whether to
work as wage laborers, or rent in land and manage cultivation directly. We assume that
tenants (or wage laborers) can work only under one landlord. 12
lOSee Rosen (1986) for a clear exposition of the theory and its applications.
11 In many agrarian societies where landowners own relatively small plots of land, or if they own large
amount of land this is fractionated in smaller plots located in different areas, it is usually the case that the
. plot is rented out to one tenant. This assumption, however, may be restrictive for the latifundia economies
characterized by landlords owning extensive land in a circumscribed area.
12If the tenant is allowed to rent in land from more than one landlord, then he would have the incentive
to rent in land and spread the labor till the marginal product of land is equal to zero.
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In general, a land contract is a pair (a, (3) that specifies the share of output that the
tenant may retain a, and the side-payment that the tenant receives from the landlord {3.
As usual, if a = °and {3 > 0, we have the pure wage contract, where (3 is the wage paid
by the landlord to the tenant. If a E (0,1) and {3 = 0, we have the pure sharecropping
system. Finally, if a = 1 and {3 < 0, we have the pure fixed rent contract, where {3 is
the rent paid by the tenant to the landlord for the use of the plot. We assume that there
is a fixed number of contract forms, and all agents choosing a specific contract form are
subject to the same conditions and terms, including the contract payments. To simplify,
in the following we consider that agents can choose among three different contract forms,
specifically a wage contract W = (0, (3w), a pure sharecropping contract S = (a, 0) and
a fixed rent contract F = (1, (3F)' Any agent choosing the wage contract, for example, is
subject to the same wage payment {3w, and similarly all landlords and tenants choosing to
enter a share tenancy contract accept a as the sharing rule. The underlying assumption is
that landlords and tenants are price-takers. The analysis, however, goes through when K
distinct sharecropping contracts are available, with associated payments ak, k = 1, ... , K,
provided that these share tenancy contracts differ in terms of side payments. 13
We assume that tenants have the outside option of migrating to a nearby city and
working in the urban sector at the competitive wage at no risk. The agricultural wage is
therefore tied to equal the urban wage discounted by migration disutility, {3w = w.
Landlords and tenants are heterogeneous in their farming ability and risk aversion.
13 As documented in Young and Burke (2001), the number of sharecropping contracts observed with positive
frequency in village economies varies. In Illinois farmers usually sign share tenancy contracts involving a
half-half, two-third or three-fifth rule. In West Bengal there is instead more variation, though in both cases
the half-half rule is by far the most common.
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Landlords are indexed by m E [0,1], and tenants by n E [0,1], so that higher values of m
and n indicate both greater farming ability and lower risk aversion.
Output. On each plot of land, output is a stochastic function of the characteristics
of the agent who manages the farm, hence of his index. We assume that under the wage
contract farming decisions are taken directly by the landlords, while under share tenancy
and fixed-rent contracts the tenant is the actual entrepreneur, and his farming ability affects
the final output. It is a well established result in the literature that under share tenancy
labor is underprovided as the tenant equates the marginal cost of farming (i.e. the wage)
to his share of the marginal product, while under wage contract and fixed-rent contracts
the entrepreneur (the landlord and the tenant respectively) obtains the entire output and
efficiently chooses the amount of labor. In the general model of this section we abstract
from input choice, but as we will show later the extension is straightforward; we therefore
assume that labor supply is inelastic. Hence, output (Y) is given by
9 (6) YL (m) if wage contract
Y = (1.1)
9 (6) YT (n) if tenurial contract
where 6 is the realization of a stochastic variable representing exogenous farming risk (re-
lated to weather, pests, etc.), and YL (.) and YT (.) are functions representing the effect on
output of the farming ability of the agent who manages the plot, i.e. the landlord under
a wage contract, and the tenant under share tenancy or fixed-rent contract. We assume
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that Y~ > 0 and Y!r > 0, and that E (g (c)) = 1 and V ar (g (c)) = a 2 . Alternatively
one may interpret the function YL (m) as the output obtained by the landlord under the
wage contract net of monitoring cost incurred to ensure that the workers hired do not shirk
effort. Landlords with greater monitoring ability would incur a lower cost, and therefore
obtain higher output. Finally, we assume multiplicative uncertainty as previously done in
the related literature.
The assumptions that: (i) landlords each own a single plot of land and tenants do not
own land, (ii) agents cannot mix contracts, and (iii) the exogenous risk is perfectly correlated
across different plots of land, ensure that the results of the analysis are not affected by the
possibility of risk diversification through multiple contracts, possibly on plots with different
exogenous risk. The focus of this paper is, in fact, on showing that share tenancy may exist
in equilibrium even in a model where the only driving force is risk sharing.
Utilities. Let UL ('; m) and UT (-; n) denote the utility functions of a generic landlord
m and tenant n respectively. Both functions satisfy the standard assumptions of continuity
and concavity. Let VL (0:, f3; m) and VT (0:, f3; n) be the expected utilities as functions of the
parameters of the contract. The expected utility of a tenant n under a generic contract
(0:, (3) can be represented by the following function
VT (0:, f3; n) = EUT [o:g (c) YT (n) + f3; n] . (1.2)
The expected utility of a landlord m can be represented by the following piece-wise linear
function of 0:
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EUL[g(e)YL(m)-{3;m] ifa=O
VL (a, (3, n; m) = (1.3)
EUL [(1 - a) 9 (c) YT (n) - {3; m] if a E (0,1].
This function is discontinuous at a = 0, Le. at the wage contract, for the following reason.
Under a wage contract the landlord manages the plot so that his farming skills affect the
final output; his expected utility is therefore function of YL (m). Under tenurial contracts,
he receives a portion of the output obtained by the tenant, so that his income under share
tenancy and fixed-rent contracts depends on the output that the tenant n, with whom he
is matched with, can obtain, i.e. YL (n). VL(a, (3, n; m) represents the expected utility of
landlord m from contract (a, (3) conditional on a specific level of tenant's ability, and the
expectation operator is taken with respect to e only, as in eq.(2). In choosing the contracts,
however, landlords take into account the uncertainty related with the ability level of the
tenant they are matched with, so that in comparing utilities across the available contracts,
they formulate rational expectations on the pools of tenants choosing the different contracts.
VL (a, (3; m) denotes the expected utility of landlord m from contract (a, (3) conditional on
the pool of tenants with whom the landlord may potentially match with.
1.3.1 Graphical Representation
In Fig.1 we plot a on the horizontal axis and {3 on the vertical axis. All points belonging
to the positive part of the vertical axis are possible wage contracts; points belonging to
the horizontal axis represent pure sharecropping contracts, i.e. with no side-payments;
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and points on the locus (a = 1, (3 < 0) represent fixed rent contracts. Since UT (.; n) is a
continuous and concave function, and its argument is a positive linear function of a and [3,
VT (a, (3; n) is a concave function. For any tenant n the indifference curves on the (a, (3)-
plane are negatively sloped and concave. Given a (or (3) tenants' utility increases with {3 (or
a), so that higher indifference curves correspond to higher levels of utility. The marginal
rate of substitution between a and [3 is given by
d{3
da
E [u~ (.; n) 9 (c) YT (n)]
EU~(';n) (1.4)
which clearly depends on n. As shown in Fig.l, given a wage contract (0, (3w) (point W), a
share tenancy contract (a, (3s) (point S) and a fixed rent contract (1, (3F) (point F), tenants
might prefer one contract or the other depending on the slope of their indifference curves. In
particular tenants with a relatively high marginal rate of substitution prefer the fixed rent
contract, while tenants with a relatively fiat indifference curve prefer the wage contract.
15
wn'" a.
F
Figure 1: Tenants' indifference curves
In a similar way we can depict landlords' indifference curves when a E (0,1] for a given
n. The landlord's utility from a given contract depends, in fact, on the expected ability of
the pool of tenants choosing that contract. For the time being, however, we only need to
represent landlords' indifference curve, and will do this by fixing the level of tenant ability,
and not the distribution of tenants conditional on their contract choice. In other words, the
only difference between two contracts in the (a, ,6)-plane is related to the payments and not
the abilities of the tenants selected in one contract or the other. As UL (-; m) is concave and
its argument is a negative linear function of a and (3, VL (a,,6, n; m) is a convex function
and the indifference curves are negatively sloped and convex for any given n, as depicted in
Fig.2. Given a (or (3) landlords' utility decreases with ,6 (or a), so that higher indifference
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curves correspond to lower levels of utility. The marginal rate of substitution is
df3
da
E [u~ ('j m) 9 (6) Yr (n)]
EU~('jm) (1.5)
which depends on m given n. Even in this case different landlords may prefer different
contracts, depending on the slope of their indifference curves. Landlords with flatter indif-
ference curves are more likely to prefer fixed-rent contracts over share tenancy.
P*
m'
a
F
Figure 2: Landlords' indifference curves
Note that the intersection of the landlords' indifference curves with the vertical axis
does not identify the wage contract that makes him indifferent with the share tenancy or
fixed rent contract, because of the discontinuity of landlords' utilities at a = O. To see
this, let VL (a', {3', nj m) be the utility level for a landlord m when he rents out the land to
a tenant with ability level n under the contract (a', {3'). The intersection of this indiffer-
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ence curve with the vertical axis is given by the payment {3* such that VL (a', (3', n; m) =
VL (0, (3*, nj m), i.e.
where we simply let the side payment {3 change, given a = 0, so that the landlord is
left indifferent with the contract (a', (3') keeping everything else constant, in particular
9 (c) YT (n). Note however that VL (0, (3*, n; m) is not a wage contract as the output depends
on the ability level of the tenant n. For a given landlord m there is a unique wage contract
such that he is indifferent between (0, (3w) and (a', (3') and it is implicitly given by
EUL [g (c) YL (m) - {3w; m] = EUL [g (c) YT (n) - {3*; m]
If the tenant n has the same ability level of the landlord, and the output functions for the
landlords and tenants are the same, then YT (n) = YL (m) and {3w = {3*, but in general this
is not true, and it is immediate to see that {3w is an increasing function of {3*.
1.3.2 Existence of Equilibrium: Outline of Proof
The approach taken to prove existence of equilibrium is strictly related to the usual approach
adopted in Walrasian economies. First of all, we consider 'markets for contracts' and try to
characterize the demand and supply in these markets. To simplify, we find restrictions on
tenants and landlords' preferences so that the demand for a specific contract comes from a
single interval of tenants, and similarly the supply comes from a single interval of landlords.
These restrictions are intended to order tenants and landlords over the unit intervals in
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terms of their marginal rate of substitution between a (the parameter of the land contract
that assigns risk and average income between the tenant and the landlord), and {3 (the
parameter of the contract that transfers income but not risk between the landlord and the
tenant). Consequently, we can easily establish continuity of demand and supply (Section 4).
Next, we make further restrictions on tenants and landlords' preferences, as well as the set of
feasible contract payments to ensure that all markets are active in equilibrium, Le. that all
land contracts are chosen in equilibrium by some landlords and tenants (Section 5). Finally
we construct a fixed-point correspondence from the set of feasible contract payments into
itself, and show that a fixed-point of this correspondence is an equilibrium for the economy;
as the set of contract payments and the correspondence satisfy the assumptions for the
application of Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, then we can show that an equilibrium exists
(Section 6).
1.4 Demand and Supply Side of the Economy
In this section we characterize the demand and supply of contracts. More specifically, we
make assumptions on tenants' and landlords' preferences such that the demand of a specific
contract comes from a single interval of tenants, and similarly the supply of such a contract
comes from a single interval of landlords. Once this is established, it is possible to express
the demand and supply for each contract simply as the cumulative density function over the
interval of types who prefer that specific contract, so that continuity of the excess demand
for each contract is easily proved. As landlords' income under share tenancy depends on
the farming skills of the tenants choosing share tenancy, we first characterize the demand
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by tenants for the different contracts, and then conditional on tenants' preferences we
characterize the supply by landlords.
1.4.1 Tenants' Demand
To ensure that the demand for each contract comes from a single interval of tenants it is
enough to assume that
A 1 ( E[u!r(.;n)9(c)YT(n)1)I' . d . . f . fSSUMPTION . Eu~(-;n) IS a contmuous an IncreasIng unctIOn 0 n(Ct,(3)
over all a E [0,1] and {3 E R.
Assumption 1 requires that tenants with higher index n have a higher marginal rate of
substitution between a and {3, so that their indifference curves are steeper. To understand
the meaning of this assumption in terms of conditions on the primitives we look at the
second-order approximation of the expected utility. Using the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of
absolute risk aversion, tenants' expected utility can be written as
[
1 2 2 2 ( u" (aYT (n) + (3) ) ]
u aYT (n) + {3 - 2"a YT (n) a u' (aYT (n) + (3) ,
and taking the total differential with respect to a and (3 of eq. (6)
(1.6)
(1.7)
Hence, for the approximated utility function, sufficient conditions for the marginal rate of
substitution to be increasing in n are:
(i) the risk premium y} (n) a2 ( - ~:) decreases with n,
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(ii) the coefficient of prudence - ~/:: increases with n.
An increase in n has two effects on the compensative risk premium necessary for a
tenant to accept the risk associated with a contract that entails higher risk (higher a).
First, as farming ability increases with n, so does the mean income of the tenant, but also
his income variance for any given level of exogenous risk (as risk enters in a multiplicative
way). The second effect is through the coefficient of absolute risk aversion; by assumption,
as n increases, tenants are less risk averse and their compensative risk premium decreases.
Condition (i) states that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion decreases with n faster
than the increase in y} (n), so that tenants indexed with higher n are more willing to take
up risk, as they need a smaller compensation. Condition (ii) is related to the sensitivity to
risk of a tenant's choices. As stated in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) and Kimball (1990),
if marginal utility is convex, then an increase in risk results in an increase in the optimal
choice of the control variable. In this specific case, if u'" is positive, higher risk results in
the choice of a higher a by the tenant. Condition (ii) requires that the higher n, the more
convex is the marginal utility, so that the more sensitive is a to increases in risk. Again,
this implies that tenants with higher n are more likely to prefer contracts with higher a,
Le. higher risk.
We start by characterizing the contract demands when there are two generic contracts
(a, (3) and (a', (3') available in the economy, and then consider the case when there are three
contracts, and show that the extension is straightforward.
LEMMA 1. Let (a,f3) and (a',f3') be any two contracts such that a ~ a' and {3 ~ f3'. If
Assumption 1 holds, then
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(i) there exists n E [0,1] such that (a, (3) >-n (0/, (3') for all 0 ~ n < n, and (a, (3) -<n
(a',(3') for all n < n ~ 1;
(ii) given (a, (3), n is a continuous function of (a', (3').
PROOF. See the Appendix
Note that if n is in the interior of the unit interval, then n is the 'marginal tenant'
or 'switchover' point and identifies the tenant indifferent between (a, (3) and (a', (3'). If
instead all tenants strictly prefer (a, (3) to (a', (3'), then n= 1 and nmay not be indifferent
between (a, (3) and (a', (3'). Similarly, if all tenants prefer (a', (3') to (a, (3), then n= O. In
any case, the contract (a, (3) is demanded by the tenants indexed [0, n), while the contract
(a' ,(3') is demanded by the tenants indexed (n, 1]. The second part of the Lemma states
that, given any two contracts, the demand for each contract is a continuous function of the
contract terms.
Lemma 1, however, concerns pair-wise comparisons of contracts. It is straightforward to
show that the demands for contracts come from single intervals of tenants even when there
are three contracts available. Intuitively in Fig.l, if a tenant n' prefers the wage contract
(point W) to the other two, then any tenant with n < n' prefers the wage contract too; and
similarly if a tenant nil prefers a fixed-rent contract (point Fin Fig.l), then any tenant with
n > nil prefers the fixed-rent contract too. Suppose now there is a tenant n'" E (n', nil) who
prefers the sharecropping contract (point S) to the other two. Any tenant n > n'" cannot
prefer the wage contract to the sharecropping one, since his indifference curve is steeper
than the one of n'" at S. Hence, tenants preferring the wage contract must belong to a
unique subinterval of tenants' types on the left of n"'; similarly for the tenants preferring
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the share tenancy contract and the-fixed rent contract.
1.4.2 Landlords' Supply
Similarly for the landlords we assume
A 2 ( E u~(-;m)g(c)YT(n) ) I . . d . . fu . fSSUMPTION. EUL .;m IS a contInuous an IncreasIng nctlOn 0(a:,,B,n)
m over all a E [0,1], {3 E Rand n E [0,1].
Assumption 2 ensures that landlords' indifference curves are steeper for higher m, for
a given value of n. By taking a second-order approximation of eq.(3) when a E (0,1], it is
possible to see that this assumption is less restrictive on the primitives of the model than
the one for the tenants. The reason is that the marginal rate of substitution depends on m
only through the preferences and not through farming ability, since under tenurial contracts
the landlord rents out the land and the output depends on the farming ability of the tenant.
Hence, in the certainty equivalent approximation of expected utility, a coefficient of absolute
risk aversion decreasing in m and a coefficient of prudence increasing in m are sufficient
conditions.
As before we characterize the supplies for two generic contracts (a, {3) and (a', {3'), and
then extend to the case when there are three available contracts in the economy.
LEMMA 2. Let (a,{3) and (a',{3') be any two contracts such that a ~ a' and {3 ~ {3'. If
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then
(i) there exists in E [0,1] such that (a, {3) -<m (a', {3') for all °~ m < in, and (a, {3) >-m
(a',{3') for all in < m ~ 1, for a given n;
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(ii) given (a,{3), in is a continuous function of (a', (3').
PROOF. See the Appendix.
Given the contracts (a, (3) and (a', (3'), by Lemma 1 we can identify the pool of tenants
preferring each contract, and define the utilities of the landlords under the two different
contracts. The landlords' choice is therefore between contract (a, (3) with tenants [0, n),
and contract (a', (3') with tenants (n, 1]. The first part of Lemma 2 states the existence
of a 'marginal landlord', such that all landlords with steeper indifference curves prefer the
contract that entails more risk (lower a), and vice versa for the landlords with flatter
indifference curves. Even in this case, if in belongs to the interior of the unit interval, then
in is the landlord indifferent between the two contracts, while if all landlords prefer one
contract over the other, then in coincides with one of the boundaries of the unit interval.
Suppose now that there are three available contracts. Let m' be a landlord preferring
the wage contract (0, (3w) to the other two contracts; his indifference curve must lie below
the sharecropping and the fixed-rent contract (as shown in Fig.2). Let (3:n, be the intercept
of the indifference curve associated with the wage contract of such a landlord. For any
landlord m > m', the indifference curve associated with the wage contract is steeper and
has a lower intercept. The intercept is, in fact, implicitly given by the following equation
for the landlord m'
hence, for any landlord m > m', YL (m) > YL (m') and {3:n < {3:n,. Therefore for m > m', the
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wage contract is also preferred to the other two contracts. Similarly, let mil be a landlord
preferring the fixed-rent contract most. It follows that any landlord m < mil prefers the
fixed-rent contract to the other available contracts. Consider now a landlord miff E (m', mil)
who prefers the share tenancy contract most. For any landlord m < mil, the indifference
curves are flatter than that of landlord m' and f3':n > f3':n,; hence, by construction in Fig.2 it is
clear that the wage contract cannot be preferred to the share tenancy contract. Therefore
landlords preferring the wage contract must belong to a unique subinterval of landlords'
types on the right of mill. Similarly, for the landlords preferring the share tenancy and
fixed-rent contract.
1.5 Restrictions on Contract Payments and Corner Solutions
In this section we find restrictions on the set of contract payments and make additional
assumptions on agents' preferences to ensure that all markets are active in equilibrium.
This allows us to discard possible corner solutions where one or more contracts are not
chosen by any landlord and tenant in equilibrium.
a) Landlords have the option of withdrawing the land from the market. Hence, in equi-
librium the rent obtained by the landlord under fixed-rent contract must be non-negative,
which implies f3F :::;; O.
b) We assume that the landlord m = 0 and the tenant n = 0 have infinite risk aversion
according to the Arrow-Pratt definition and that the support of 9 (c) is unbounded. This
implies that: (i) there is always a strictly positive demand for wage contract by tenants,
independently of the share of output that the tenant may retain under share tenancy and of
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the rent to be paid under fixed-rent contracts, (ii) similarly, there is always a strictly positive
supply of fixed-rent contracts by landlords, independently of the share of output under share
tenancy and the wage to pay under wage contracts. This ensures that in equilibriwn both
the fixed-rent contract and the wage contract are chosen by at least some landlords and
tenants.
c) Let f!.F be the rent that makes the tenant n = 1 indifferent between the wage contract
with payment f3w = wand the fixed-rent contract (see Fig.3). For any rent greater than
If!.F I, then no tenant demands the fixed-rent contract, as the wage contract dominates
it. Since in equilibriwn the fixed-rent contract is offered by at least some landlords, I~FI
constitutes an upper bound to the payment that landlords may ask from their tenants in
equilibriwn.
Figure 3: Restrictions on contract payments
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d) Let (3Fbe a generic rent belonging to the interval [~F' 0]. Let n be the tenant indif-
ferent between the wage contract with (3w = wand the fixed-rent contract; his indifference
curve is as depicted in Fig.3. nis a decreasing function of f3F since for higher rent payments
the tenant indifferent with the wage contract needs to be more able and less risk averse.
Let a ((3F) be the share of output that makes the tenant n indifferent between the wage
contract and the share tenancy contract. For any a < a ((3F), then no tenant demands the
share tenancy contract. This is easily seen in Fig.3. Since all tenants indexed by n < nhave
indifference curves flatter than the ones of tenant n, they prefer the wage contract to the
fixed-rent and share tenancy contract; tenants indexed by n > n have indifference curves
steeper than tenant n and prefer the fixed-rent contract most. Since for any a < a ((3F) no
tenant chooses to sharecrop, landlords' expected income under share tenancy is zero. For
any landlord share tenancy is therefore dominated by the fixed-rent contract, that offers
the landlord full insurance and a fixed income equal to (3F' Any a < a ((3F) can support
an equilibrium where share tenancy is not chosen by any tenant or landlord. To avoid this,
we restrict the set of feasible shares to be a > a(f3F), so that there is a strictly positive
demand of share tenancy contracts by tenants. 14
In Fig.4 the shaded area represents the set of contract payments that satisfies the re-
strictions in a), c) and d). We will denote this set by n. As (3F increases, a ((3F) increases.
The set n is not strictly convex. To see this, take any two rent payments (3} and (3}, such
14 Given that /3 is constructed as the fixed rent that makes tenant n = 1 indifferent between the wage
-F
contract and the fixed-rent contract, then for any /3FE (~F' 0), the indifferent tenant between the wage
contract and the fixed-rent contract n belongs to the interior of the unit interval. Let a > a (/3F)' and n1
be the tenant indifferent between the wage contract and share tenancy; by construction n1 < n. Similarly
let n2 be the tenant indifferent between share tenancy and the fixed-rent contract, then n2 > n. By Lemma
1, the sharecropping contract is demanded by the tenants in the interval (nl,n2); since nl < n < n2, then
the demand for share tenancy is strictly positive.
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that i1} < i1}, and let al = a (i1}) and a2 = a (i1}) , where a (i1}) and a (i1}) are as
defined in point d), hence al < a2. Let i1F = Ai1} + (1 - A) i1} with AE [0,1] be a convex
combination of i1} and i1}, and a* = Aal + (1 - A) a2 be the convex combination of al and
a2. The set n is convex if a (i1F) < a* for any AE [0, 1], as shown in FigA. But a (i1F) < a*
if and only if A< Q2- a(.Bj;.). Note however that a (i1F* ) depends on Aas well; in particularQ2- Q l
for A = ° a (a* ) = al and Q2-a(.Bj;.) = 1 while for A = 1 a (Q* ) = a2 and Q2- a(.Bj;.) = 0'
, fJF Q2- Ql' , fJF Q2-Ql'
as A increases, so does a (i1F* ), while the function Q2-a(.Bj;.) decreases. Hence, if plottingQ2-Ql
the functions A and Q2-a(.Bj;.) over the interval [0,1], the former is a straight increasing line,Q2- Q l
while the latter is strictly decreasing. For A sufficiently high, the inequality that ensures
strict convexity of n is not satisfied.
a
I
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Figure 4: Set of contract payments
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1.6 The Existence Theorem
In this section we state and prove the existence theorem for our economy. The approach
we take is similar to the one traditionally adopted for a standard Walrasian economy.
We consider the excess demand functions for each contract type, construct a fixed-point
correspondence from a non-empty, compact, convex set of contract payments into itself,
show that the fixed point of this correspondence is an equilibrium in our economy, and
verify that the fixed-point correspondence satisfies the conditions for applying Kakutani's
fixed-point theorem.
Since there are three 'markets' for land contracts, clearing conditions for two of these
markets ensure that the economy is in equilibrium. Consider therefore the markets for
share tenancy and fixed-rent contracts. As seen in Section 4, the demands and supplies for
contracts come from single intervals of tenants and landlords, and are continuous. Denote
by Zs (a,{3F) and ZF (a,{3F) the excess demand for share tenancy and fixed-rent contract
respectively. Given the continuity of the supply and demand functions, these excess demand
functions are continuous. Since the wage is determined exogenously by the presence of an
urban sector, only the share and the rent are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Denote by 0 the convex hull of O. This set is non-empty, compact and convex.
THEOREM 1. If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, then there exists a pair (a, (3F) E n such
that Zs (a, (3F) = 0 and ZF (a, (3F) = O.
PROOF. We proceed in five steps. In the first three steps, we construct the fixed-point
correspondence f (Q, (3F)' We need, in fact, to construct a correspondence for
1. (Q, (3F) belonging to the interior of 0,
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2. (a, f3F) belonging to the boundary of (2 with the exclusion of the point {a = 1, f3F = O},
3. (a, f3F) belonging to the complement of (2 with respect to its convex hull and the
singleton {a = 1, f3F = O}.
In the fourth step, we show that a fixed point of such a correspondence is an equilibrium.
Finally, in the fifth step we verify that the correspondence satisfies the conditions for the
application of Kakutani's fixed point theorem, establishing the existence of a fixed point
for the correspondence. The only point of departure from the standard approach may
seem to be in that the landlords' supply for each contract depends on the tenants' choices.
Given that in section 4 we have shown continuity of landlords' supply conditional on the
distributions of tenants choosing the different contracts, it is enough to impose that in
equilibrium excess demands are zero to have that all markets clear and landlords and tenants
choices are compatible with each other.
Step 1: Construction of the fixed-point correspondence for (a,f3F) E Interior n.
For any (a, f3F) in the interior of the set n (the shaded area in Fig. 5) we define
f (a, f3F) = {(a" f3~) En: (a', f3~) = arg max Zs (a, f3F) . (1 - a") + zF (a, f3F) . If3~ I} .
(QII,f3'J;. )
(1.8)
Note that Zs (a, f3F) . (1 - a") + ZF (a, (3F) '1{3~Irepresents the value of excess demand
where (1 - a") (i.e. the share that goes to the landlord under share tenancy) and I,B~1
(i.e. the rent paid to the landlord under fixed-rent contracts) represent the 'prices' that
the tenant pays under each contract. Therefore, given (a, (3F), this correspondence assigns
(ex' ,(3~) that maximize the value of excess demand. To better understand, suppose that
30
at (a, f3F) the economy has an excess demand of fixed-rent contracts and an excess supply
of share tenancy, i.e. ZF (a, f3F) > °and Zs (a, f3F) < 0. The correspondence then assigns
f3~ = !!.F and a' = 1, i.e. it assigns the highest possible rent (given that the market had
excess demand of fixed-rent contracts) and the highest possible share for the tenant (given
that there was excess supply of share tenancy contracts). Similarly, if ZF (a, f3F) > °and
Zs (a, f3F) > 0, then the correspondence assigns f3~ = !!.F and a' = a (!!.F)' It is easy
to check that even when ZF (a,f3F) < °and Zs (a,f3F) 50, the correspondence assigns a
vector of 'prices' (a', f3~) which is on the boundary of n.
a
_-L- -'" 0
!iF
Figure 5
Step 2: Construction of the fixed-point correspondence for
(a, f3F) E Boundary OJ {a = 1, f3F = O}.
For any (a, f3F) belonging to the boundary of 0 (the darker line in Fig.5) with the
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exclusion of the point {a = 1, {3F = o} we define the following correspondence
f (a,{3F) = {(a',{3'p) En: I{3FI·I{3'p1 + (1 - a) . (1 - a') = o}. (1.9)
Note that for any (a, (3F), the function I{3FI·I{3'p1 + (1- a)· (1 - a') is equal to zero only
for {3'p = 0 and a' = 1. Hence no (a, (3F) on the boundary of n with the exclusion of the
singleton {a = 1, {3F = o} can be a fixed point of the correspondence.
Step 3: Construction of the fixed-point correspondence for (a, (3F) E n/n u {a = 1, {3F = a}.
Finally, the last correspondence is defined over the complement of the set n with respect
to its convex hull and the singleton {a = 1,{3F = O}. For any (a,{3F) belonging to this set
we define the following correspondence
f (a, (3F) = {(a', (3'p) E n : 1{3F - !iF 1'!{3'p - !iF I+ (1 - a) . (1 - a') = O} . (1.10)
Note that for any (a, (3F), the function I{3F - !iFI·I{3'p - !iF I+ (1- a) . (1 - a') is equal
to zero only if {3'p = !iF and a' = 1; therefore, as in step 2, no (a, (3F) over which this
correspondence is defined can be a fixed point.
Step 4: A fixed point of f is an equilibrium where all markets are active
Suppose (a*, (3'F) is a fixed point of f. Then, as pointed out in step 2 and 3, (a*, (3'F )
must belong to the interior of n. If Zs (a*, (3'F) =1= 0 and/or ZF (a*, (3'F) =1= 0, then as seen
in step 1 f(a*,{3'F) C Boundary n, which contradicts the fact that (a*,{3'F) is a fixed
point of f and that (a*, (3'F) E Interior n. Hence, it must be that Zs (a* , (3'F) = 0 and
ZF (a*, (3'F) = o.
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Step 5: Kakutani's fixed point theorem
To apply Kakutani's fixed point theorem, we need to ensure that: a) 0 is nonempty,
compact and convex; b) f is convex valued and upper hemicontinuous. It is immediate
to see that a) holds. To prove upper hemicontinuity we need to show that if taking two
sequences (an,f3Fn ) -+ (a,{3F) and (a~,{3~n) -+ (d,{3~) with (a~,{3~n) E f(an,{3Fn),
then (a', (3~) E f (a, (3F)' We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: (a, (3F) E Interior O. Then (an,(3Fn ) belongs to the interior of 0 for n
large enough, and Zs (an, (3Fn) . (1 - a~) + ZF (an,{3Fn ) '113~nl ~ Zs (an, (3Fn) . (1 - a") +
zF(an,I3Fn) ·1{3}1 for any (a",{3}) by definition of fin stepl. By continuity of Z we get
zs(a,{3F)'(1-a')+zF(a,{3)'II1~1~ zs(a,I1F)·(1-a")+zF(a,{3F)·II1~1for any (a",I1~)
which implies (a',I3~) E f(a,I1F)'
Case 2: (a,I1F) E Boundary 0/ {a = 1,I1F = O}. There are two different situations. If
(an, (3Fn) belongs to Boundary 0/ {a = 1, {3F = O}, then (a~, l1'pn) E f (an, (3Fn) is such
that a~ = 1 and l1~n = 0 by definition of f in step 2. But this implies that d = 1 and
11~ = 0, and that II1FI'II1~I+(l-a)·(l- a') = 0, hence (a',I1~) E f(a,{3F) by definition of
f in step 2. If instead (an, 11Fn) belongs to Interior 0 but it is close enough to the boundary,
then by definition of f in step 1, f will assign a~ = 1 if an is close to the lower boundary
of 0, and l1~n = 0 if I3Fn is close to ~F' Hence, again II3F I '111~1 + (1 - a) . (1 - d) = 0
and (a',I3~) E f (a,I1F)' This shows that f is continuous across the boundaries of O.
Case 3: (a,I3F) E 0/0, U {a = 1, I3F = O}. For n large enough (an, I3Fn) belongs to the
interior of the set 0/0, and by definition of f in step 3, a~ = 1 and {3~n =!!.r Hence a' = 1
and 11~ = ~F and 111F - ~F l'll3~ -~F 1+ (1 - a) .(1 - a') = 0, so that (a', 11~) E f (a, 11F)'
To prove that f is convex-valued is enough to notice that f is a level set of a linear
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function defined on the convex set n and it is convex (see Mas-Colell, et al., 1995). We can,
therefore, conclude that there exists a (a*, f3}) E 0 such that (a*, f3}) = f (a* , f3}).
1.7 Comparative Statics: the Effect of Risk on Contract
Choice
One of the major pitfalls of agency theory, when applied to the study of agrarian contracts,
is that it leads to the prediction that the relative frequency of share tenancy with respect
to fixed rent contracts should increase when farming risk increases. As mentioned earlier in
this chapter, empirical evidence is sometimes at odds with this conclusion. In this section we
show that the theoretical framework proposed is able, under certain conditions, to predict
a negative relation between farming risk and frequency of share tenancy relative to fixed
rent contracts.
Note first that, in the model proposed, the only source of uncertainty is related to
output, and is purely exogenous. No individual action may affect the degree of output
uncertainty represented by the random variable c. This is absolutely compatible with
the traditional models of moral hazard, so that the respective predictions can be easily
compared. Furthermore, in the following we always refer to higher uncertainty in farming
activity as a situation where the variance of the random shock on output, i.e. a~, is higher.
This implies that the results of the comparative statics can directly be tested empirically,
after obtaining a measure of exogenous output variance.
In general, in the model proposed the effect of exogenous risk on the equilibrium fre-
quency of contracts depends in a complex way on the individuals' preferences towards risk,
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their ability and the initial level of risk. In the following, we study a parameterized ver-
sion of the model and analyze the relation between risk and contract choice under different
situations. Even though it is not possible to obtain precise restrictions on the sets of pa-
rameters that generate a positive or negative relation between risk and relative frequency
of share tenancy over fixed rent contracts, the numerical examples help obtain an idea of
the different forces underlying the model and of the cases in which a negative relation is
more likely to occur.
The parameterized model we use for the simulation assumes the following:
(a) the production function is Cobb-Douglas in labor, and additive in risk and ability;
(b) the utilities display constant absolute risk aversion;
(c) agents' types are distributed uniformly over the intervals [0,1] and [0, '71].
More specifically we assume that the production function takes the following form
.eCT + bLm + g (c) if wage contract
y=
.eCT + bT~ + g (c) if tenurial contract
(1.11)
where bL and bT represents the productivity of landlords and tenants' farming skills re-
spectively. Note furthermore that under tenurial contracts, it is the relative ability of the
tenants that matters and not the absolute level, so that the results do not depend on the
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absolute indexing of the tenants over the interval [0, n]. The optimal choice of labor is
( cT ) l~cf3 w if wage contract
(1.12)
....L.(~C:) l-c if tenurial contract.
The utility functions are of the form u = -~ exp (-,I), where I is the income obtained by
the agents under a specific land contract, and I is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Such a coefficient is a function of the agents' type, and we assume that it takes the form
IT (n~n) for a tenant n
(1.13)
IL (1 - m) for a landlord m.
This functional form satisfies the Assumption 1 in section 3, i.e. agents with a higher index
are less risk averse. IT and IL are parameters that regulate the average risk aversion of
the pool of tenants and landlords. Assuming that landlords and tenants are uniformly
distributed over the intervals [0,1] and [0, n], then the risk aversion of the median tenant is
1[-, while for the median landlord is Jt.
Note that we depart from the model described in the previous sections in one relevant
dimension. Labor choice is endogenous, in the sense that the tenant under a share tenancy or
fixed rent contract, and the landlord under a wage contract respectively choose the quantity
of labor to use. Though we assume implicitly that monitoring labor under a wage contract
is costless, so that no shirking may arise from the tenant side, the traditional result of
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Marshallian inefficiency of share tenancy holds since the tenant chooses labor by equating
the full marginal cost of labor to his share of the marginal output. Since we now allow
landlords to hire multiple tenants under the wage contracts, we need to assume that n> 1,
i.e. the support of tenants' type is greater than the one for the landlords. This ensures that
there is no binding constraint on the availability of wage workers, even if landlords decide
to hire more than one laborer under wage contracts.
Let rit be the tenant indifferent between the wage and the sharecropping contract,
and n2 be the tenant indifferent between the share tenancy and the fixed rent contracts;
similarly, let ml and m2 be the respective marginal landlords. These marginal agents
are identified by equating the utilities out of the respective contracts they are indifferent
with. These conditions give a system of four equations in six unknowns, i.e. the four
marginal agents plus the contract payments a and f3F' To close the system and get the
solution we impose that in equilibrium the demand of fixed rent contracts must equal the
supply, i.e. n - n2 = m2, and similarly for the demand and supply of share tenancy, i.e.
- -- -- --
n2 - nl = m2 - mI·
For the numerical exercise, we need to parameterize the model assigning values to f3w
and c; since in perfect competition the labor share of output is equal to the real wage, we
set both of them equal to 0.8. 15 The range of values for the exogenous risk over which we
simulate the changes in the equilibrium ratio of sharecropping over fixed rent contracts is
[0.5,1.5]. This range is consistent in equilibrium with a coefficient of variation (i.e. variance
of the output over average output) ranging from 20 to 70 percent which is what found by
15This value is close to the empirical estimate obtained in Chapter 2.
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Walker and Ryan (1990) in India.
In Fig.6 we show the variation in the equilibrium proportion of sharecropping over fixed
rent contracts when the average coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the landlords is
equal to 1 and the average coefficient for the tenants ranges from 0.5 to 3. The average
ability of the two groups is fixed and equal to 1. Note that the relative frequency of share
tenancy to fixed rent contracts depends negatively on risk for low values of tenants' average
risk aversion, while it has a non-monotonic relation for higher values. This result, however,
is not robust to changes in the benchmark level of landlords' average risk aversion. Fig.7
shows the simulation of the model when the landlords' average coefficient of risk aversion
is raised to 2. The non-monotonic relation with risk disappears and the contracts' ratio
always decreases.
To clarify these results, let us look at the separate effects that a change in risk has on the
demand and supply for contracts. An increase in farming risk causes the tenants' indifference
curves to become flatter, so that the marginal tenants correspond now to higher indices. In
other words, given the higher level of output risk, the marginal tenants must have lower risk
aversion and higher ability, as the contract payments have not been adjusted to compensate
for the higher risk. A variation in the marginal tenants implies a variation in the demand
for the different contracts, and in particular an increase in risk shifts tenants preferences
towards less risky contracts, Le. from the fixed rent contract to the sharecropping one, and
from the sharecropping to the wage contract. Clearly, this effect depends on the average
coefficient of risk aversion; if tenants are on average highly risk averse, then the relative
demands of the different contracts are more sensitive to a change in risk. On the other side,
landlords' supply of contracts is affected by a variation in risk in two ways. First, there
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is a direct effect similar to the one analyzed for the tenants, under the assumption that
landlords are risk averse. In this case, an increase in risk shifts landlords' preferences from
wage contract to share tenancy, and from share tenancy to fixed rent contracts. A second
indirect effect is, instead, due to the change in the pool of tenants choosing sharecropping,
which affects the landlords' mean income and risk associated with share tenancy. In general
higher risk selects more able tenants into sharecropping, so that the expected output under
share tenancy increases. But nothing can be said about the induced change in the variance
of the pool of tenants.
It is therefore not possible to sign the overall effect of an increase in risk on the equi-
librium distribution of contracts, as it depends on the relative elasticities of the agents'
preferences towards risk. In presence of this indirect effect, matters become even more
complex. It is still possible, however, to give an intuitive explanation for the results shown
in Fig.6 and 7.
First, consider the case when the landlords' average coefficient of risk aversion is rela-
tively small (, L = 1). When risk is low, an increase in risk induces a substantial shift in the
marginal tenants (since the percentage increase in risk is quite high), so that the average
level of tenants' skills under share tenancy increases significantly. If the tenants' average
coefficient of risk aversion is relatively high, the direct effect of risk on tenants' preferences
is amplified, while it does not have the same strength on the supply side given that IL is
low. The new equilibrium is therefore the results of two main forces: on one side tenants
move from fixed rent contracts to share tenancy contracts, on the other side landlords find
share tenancy more attractive because of the better selection of tenants. In this situation,
therefore, an increase in risk is more likely to cause an increase in the relative frequency
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of share tenancy over fixed rent contracts. This case corresponds to the upper-left part of
Fig.6. For lower levels of tenants' average risk aversion, the effect of risk on tenants' pref-
erences is milder, and so is the indirect effect on output under share tenancy. This explains
the flatter curves at the bottom-left part of the diagram, where apparently a change in risk
has very little effect on the contract ratio. If we move further to the right of the diagram,
and consider higher levels of risk, we are attenuating the effect of an increase in risk on
tenants' preferences (since the percentage increase is lower), and therefore the strength of
the output effect. This causes the share of sharecropping contracts over fixed rent ones to
remain unaltered (if tenants risk aversion is low - bottom-right corner of the diagram), or
to even decrease (upper-right corner).
In this scenario an increase in landlords' average coefficient of risk aversion is reinforcing
the direct effect of risk on landlords' preferences, for which there is a shift from share
tenancy towards fixed rent contracts. Therefore, an increase in 'L makes it more likely that
in equilibrium an increase in risk causes the relative frequency of share tenancy to decrease
with respect to fixed rent contracts.
Finally, in Fig.8 we show the equilibrium proportion of share tenancy over fixed rent
contracts when the coefficients of average risk aversion are both set equal to 1, and the
landlords' average ability level is 1. For a low level of risk, the output effect under share
tenancy becomes more and more important as the average tenants' ability increases, so that
a positive relation of the contract ratio with risk is more likely to occur (upper-left corner of
the picture). In all other cases, this effect is milder so that the curves have either a negative
slope or are flat.
These results show that even in a model where share tenancy is chosen only for its
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risk-sharing feature, its relative frequency may actually decrease with risk. Furthermore,
even in the presence of substantial risk aversion on the tenants' side, and even in the case
when tenants are more risk averse than landlords, this negative relation may still hold.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we propose an original theoretical framework to analyze the choice of agrarian
contracts in risky environments. Differently from the canonical agency model, typically
applied in the literature, we adopt a general equilibrium framework where landlords as
well as tenants choose the contract they prefer considering as given the contract payments.
Market forces push the payments so as to remove excess demands in equilibrium. We
show that this model can predict, under certain conditions, that the ratio of share tenancy
contracts over fixed rent contracts observed in equilibrium may depend negatively on risk,
even in presence of substantial risk aversion on the tenants' side.
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Appendix: Proofs
LEMMA 1. (PROOF)
(i) A rigorous proof is in Westhoff (1974). Intuitively, given Assumption 2, it is immedi-
ate to see that the indifference curves of any two tenants intersect only once. Let 71 be such
that (0:, (3) f'Vii, (a', (3'). Take any n < 71; by assumption the slope of n's indifference curve
passing through (0:, (3) is lower than the slope of the indifference curve of 71 (see Fig.Al).
As two indifference curves intersect only once, then (a', (3') must be in the worse than set
of tenant n, so that (0:,,8) ~n (a', (3'). Similarly for n > 71.
a.
n'
a.'
Figure Al
a.
(ii) Let 71 (a',{3') be the tenant such that (a,{3) >-n (a',{3') Vn E [0,71 (a', (3')), and
(0:, (3) -<n (a', (3') Vn E (71 (a', ,8') , 1]. To prove that n(a' ,,8') is continuous in (0:', (3')
for given (a, (3), we need to show that VE > 0, :3 8 > °such that if Io:~ - 0:~1 < 8 and
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I~~ - ~~ I< fJ, then In (a~, ~~) - n(a~ ,~D I< E.
Let n (a~, ~~) as defined above when comparing (a,~) and (a~, ~~), then the following
is true
(a,f3) >-n(ah,13h)-E (a~,fJ~) and
(a,~) -<n(ah,13h)+E (a~, ~~) , 'iE > O.
Hence for the tenant n (a~, f3~) - E the contract (a,~) lies above the indifference curve, while
the contract (a~, f3~) lies below the indifference curve. The opposite is true for n (a~, f3~) +E,
as shown in Fig.A2. Construct the largest possible circle around (a~, ~~) that intersects
each indifference curve at most once, and let the radius be fJ > O. Take any (a~, f3D
within the circle, and let n(a~, ~D be the marginal tenant when comparing (a,~) and
(a~, f3D. By construction (a,~) >-n(ah,13h)-E (a~, f3D and (a,~) -<n(ah,13h)+E (a~, ~D· Then
n(a~, ~~) - E < n(a~, f3D < n(a~, f3~) + E. Hence In (a~, f3~) - n(a~, ~D I< E.
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LEMMA 2. (PROOF)
(i) Similarly to part (i) in Lemma 1, it is possible to show that there exists a iii such
that, for all landlords m < iii, (a, (3) -<m (a', (3') for any given n, and vice versa for
m > iii. Indicate this 'marginal landlord' by iii (n), to make clear that the switchover point
depends on the specific level of tenant's ability n. We need to show, however, that such a
marginal landlord exists conditional on the tenants' preferences over (a, (3) and (a', (3'), and
therefore conditional on n. Let V (a, (3, n; m) be the expected utility of landlord m under
contract (a, (3) conditional on the specific level of tenant's ability n, as defined in eq.(3).
Given the two contracts (a,{3) and (a', (3'), by Lemma 1 we know that the pool of tenants
[O,n) prefers (a,{3), while the tenants (n,l] prefer contract (a', (3'). The expected utility
of landlord m unconditional on n, but conditional on tenant's preferences, is given by the
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expected utility over the ability level of the tenants choosing the contract (a, (3) and it is
therefore given by
J.fi 1V (a, (3, n; m) -;:;dn.o n
Similarly the expected utility from contract (a', (3') is given by
In
l
(" ) 1V a ,{3 ,njm --_-dn.
fi I-n
We need to show that there exists an iii such that
J.nV (a, (3, n; m) ~dn <o . n
and J.n V (a, (3, n; m) ~dn >
o n
{l V (a',{3',n;m) ~dn if m < iiiin I-n
{l V (a', {3',n; m) ~dn if m > iii.in I-n
We prove this by showing that Jon V (a, (3, n; m) *dn- Ii V (a', (3', n; m) r!:ndn is increasing
inm.
First, scale each landlord's utility so that V (a, (3, n; m) = c for all m, where c is a con-
stant. This implies that Jon V (a, (3, nj m) *dn = c. Note that V (a, (3, n; m) - V (a', (3', n; m)
is an increasing function of m. This follows from the fact that less risk averse landlords
(higher m) require lower compensation to accept the higher risk associated with the con-
tract (a,{3). Hence,
d~ [V(a,{3,n;m) - V (a',{3',n;m)] - d~V (a',{3',n;m) > 0
d (" )=* dmVa, {3 ,n; m < O.
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and
[
- 1 ] 1
dd (n V(a,,B,n;m) ~dn - { V (a',,B',n;m) ~dn = - { dd V (ci,,B',n;m) ~dn > O.m Jo n Iii 1 - n In m 1 - n
(ii) Continuity of the switchover landlord can be established following the same line of
proof as for the marginal tenant.
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Chapter 2
Land Contracts as a TW"o-Side
Occupational Choice: NeW"
Evidence of Risk-Sharing in India
2.1 Introduction
The canonical Principal-Agent model, applied to the analysis of land contracts, predicts
that higher farming risk is associated with higher frequency of share tenancy over fixed rent
contracts. Empirical evidence is somewhat mixed. A few studies have found a negative
empirical relation between crop risk and the incidence of sharecropping (Rao, 1971; Allen
and Lueck, 1999), while in others share tenancy seems indeed to be associated with riskier
crops (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2000).
A possible explanation for these findings is that most of the empirical work is based
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on the assumption that crop choice is exogenous, in the sense that crop choice is entirely
driven by the plot characteristics. Therefore, the riskiness of the plot can be proxied fairly
well by the riskiness of the crop cultivated. However, if the crop can be chosen by the
cultivator of the plot, then there may be incentives for the fixed rent tenants to choose
riskier crops than share tenants. Since these incentives cannot be ruled out even within
a Principal-Agent framework, the empirical observation of fixed rent contracts associated
more frequently with riskier crops does not imply a rejection of the agency theory models. 1
Instead, in order to test for the Principal-Agent framework, empirical work should explore
the relation between contract choice and farming risk, controlling for crop choice incentives.
More generally, however, the Principal-Agent framework may be subject to criticism
when used to study certain agrarian economies, due to the sometimes unrealistic assumption
of an exploitative landlord-peasant relationship. In the previous chapter we showed how in a
competitive framework, where landlords and tenants decide the contract to sign considering
as given the contract payments, both economic agents can gain a surplus, and the predicted
relation between risk and contract choice depends on the primitives of the model.
The purpose of the present chapter is to shed light on the empirical determinants of
contract choice and the risk-sharing role of share tenancy in an agrarian economy. Our
attention is focused on the Indian villages that participated in the survey conducted by the
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) between 1975
and 1984. In this area weather uncertainty and soil characteristics make agricultural activity
highly risky compared to the rest of the country, so that there is significant scope for risk-
1 Basu (1992) finds that a Principal-Agent model with limited liability generates a moral hazard problem
in risk-taking behavior by the tenant; hence, tenants under fixed rent contracts engage in riskier farming
techniques than share tenants.
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sharing through contract choice. Our empirical strategy is first to test the predictions of the
principal-agent framework allowing crop choice to be endogenous, and second to analyze the
empirical relation between risk and contract choice using the theoretical approach formalized
in Chapter 1.
To test the principal-agent theory, we derive different sets of predictions on the relation
between contract choice and plot risk on one hand, and contract choice and crop risk on
the other, under both assumptions that crop choice is exogenous and endogenous. This
involves obtaining two different measures of output risk for any given plot, one related
to the exogenous risk of farming a specific plot regardless of the crop planted, and the
other related to the crop uncertainty. We find that in the villages studied share tenancy is
more frequent than fixed rent contracts when exogenous plot uncertainty is lower, whether
crop choice is considered exogenous or not. Thus the predictions of the Principal-Agent
framework are unambiguously rejected.
Next, we estimate a parameterized version of the model described in the previous chap-
ter, that captures the specific features of the Indian villages under study. The structural
form proposed separately models the probabilities of landlords to offer and tenants to ac-
cept the different contracts, and it embeds both the risk-sharing features and the effort
incentive problems related to the specific contracts. Hence, the structural estimates of the
model allow us to: a) identify the risk-sharing mechanism after controlling for the effect
of moral hazard on the individual choices, and b) disentangle the effect of output risk on
the preferences of landlords and tenants. In this way it is possible to understand whether
share tenancy is more frequent in less risky environments because risk-sharing is irrelevant
or because such relation is the resulting 'net effect' of risk on the contract distribution that
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combines the effects on both sides of the land contract market.
We find that both landlords and tenants are risk averse so that there is significant scope
for them to trade and share risk through share tenancy in the ICRISAT villages. Hence,
the observed negative relation between risk and incidence of share tenancy is not due to
the non-existence of the risk-sharing motive, but to the fact that the observed outcome is
a 'reduced form' relation.
More generally, our contribution is to show that the Principal-Agent framework may fail
to capture the existing social and economic relations in some agrarian economies, and to
propose a different framework that better fits the data. While the focus of the paper is on
the positive economic question of contract choice, it also has a policy implication. For a long
time, share tenancy has been considered a deplorable way in which landowners exploited
landless tenants, and many countries have forbidden its practice. 2 However, if tenants
choose the contracts they sign, and market forces efficiently select tenants and landlords in
specific contractual arrangements, then it may not be welfare improving to eliminate share
tenancy as it matches landlords and tenants with complementary features and compatible
needs. Therefore understanding how the market for land contracts works in these villages
is of crucial importance in order to decide future policies. Also, if share tenancy is indeed
chosen for its risk-sharing features, then its forceful elimination in developing countries
where insurance markets are absent or limited may actually worsen the welfare of those
economic agents for whom the policy is intended.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main weaknesses
2In 1955 the Indian government approved the Land Reform Act enabling registered share tenants to claim
permanent and inheritable incumbency rights to the plots taken up under share tenancy, and capping the
landlords' share to 25 percent. The ultimate purpose of the Act was to eradicate share tenancy.
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of agency theory when applied to land contracts and describes in more details the alternative
theoretical model. Section 3 presents the predictions of the principal-agent framework tested
in the empirical analysis, while Section 4 develops the econometric structural model. In
Section 5 we describe the data and how we construct crucial variables. Finally Section 6
presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Moral Hazard Models: Theory and Evidence
The first application of the principal-agent framework to the analysis of land contracts is
Stiglitz (1974), which addresses the issue of moral hazard in tenants' effort. At the core
of the model is the idea that if output is uncertain, the landlord cannot verify the effort
provided by the tenant unless he closely monitors farming activity. If monitoring is costly,
tenant's effort has to be elicited through the structure of the contract offered, by linking
his payoff to the final output. This mechanism of incentive provision, however, exposes
the tenant to farming uncertainty, and if the tenant is risk averse, then it may become too
costly for the landlord to provide high-powered incentive and at the same time satisfy the
participation constraint of the tenant. The choice between wage contract, share tenancy
and fixed rent contract is then dictated by the trade-off between incentive provision and
insurance. When uncertainty increases, the risk-bearing motive becomes more important,
and the landlord is more likely to switch from the fixed rent contract, which is the best
incentive-wise, to a less powered contract such as share tenancy. Eventually, in extremely
risky environments, it may even be optimal for the landlord to thoroughly give up on
incentive provision and fully insure the tenant by offering a wage contract. This canonical
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set up, therefore, predicts that the incidence of share tenancy with respect to fixed rent
contracts depends positively on output risk, while the probability of observing share tenancy
relative to wage contracts should decrease with risk.
More recently, many efforts have been made to incorporate more realistic features of
agrarian economies into this basic framework. Ghatak and Pandey (2000) study the optimal
contract when there is joint moral hazard in productive effort, which affects the mean of the
output distribution, and in risk-taking behavior, which affects the spread of the distribution.
Such moral hazard in risk from the tenant's side is induced by the presence of the limited
liability clause by which the tenant cannot be held responsible for the rent if his income (or
wealth) at the end of the cropping season is below some threshold. Such a clause makes the
tenant act as a risk-lover agent and induces a form of moral hazard in risk-taking behavior,
such as choice of crops, use of fertilizer and water resources, and more general farming
decision making. 3 The main results of their study are that: a) the wage contract is never
offered by the landlord, and b) share tenancy is more likely to be observed over fixed rent
contracts if moral hazard in risk is more severe than moral hazard in effort. The intuition
is that even though the wage contract eliminates the moral hazard in risk, it has a severe
incentive problem. Hence the share tenancy contract is always better than a wage contract,
as the resulting increase in effort dominates the increase in risk. Between share tenancy
and fixed rent contract, the choice is dictated by the relative importance of the two types
of moral hazard. If moral hazard in risk is relatively more severe, then the landlord finds
optimal to discourage risk-taking behavior through share tenancy at the cost of reducing
incentive on effort. The key point therefore is that if moral hazard in risk is present, riskier
3Basu (1992) first studied the effect of limited liability on the optimal contract.
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farming techniques would be associated with fixed rent contracts.
The empirical literature on sharecropping focused on the relation between risk and con-
tract choice in order to test the main predictions of the principal-agent model with moral
hazard. In Rao (1971) and Allen and Lueck (1992, 1995, 1999) very different contemporane-
ous agrarian economies (semi-arid Indian villages and North-American farms respectively)
are studied and the results show that sharecropping is more frequently observed than fixed
rent contracts when less risky crops are cultivated. Under the hypothesis that crops planted
are exogenously determined, the authors conclude that share tenancy is more commonly
chosen in less risky environments, contrary to the theoretical prediction. In Ackerberg
and Botticini (2000), where attention is focused on historical Italian data, riskier crops are
instead found to be more likely observed under sharecropping.
Ackerberg and Botticini (2001) attempt to reconcile these empirical results with the
theoretical predictions by arguing that the econometric specifications may suffer from en-
dogeneity bias due to the agents' matching and the intertwining of the moral hazard and
risk-sharing motives. Given that in a moral hazard framework there may be incentives for
heterogeneous tenants to match with particular landlords, correlation in personal charac-
teristics may cause biased estimates if some characteristic is partially observed or poorly
proxied, so that the true effect of risk on contract choice may be obscured by incentive on
matching. They approach the problem by proposing a reduced form matching equation
to estimate jointly with a contract choice equation and find evidence that less risk averse
tenants are more likely to accept fixed rent contracts, hence concluding that there are sig-
nificant incentives on matching based on agents' attitude towards risk. However, even after
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controlling for endogenous matching, they find that the effect of cultivation risk on the
type of contract offered by the landlords mayor may not be significant depending on the
instruments set and functional forms used, so that again there is no strong evidence in favor
or against the principal-agent model predictions.
A problem common to all the empirical papers cited, however, is the maintained as-
sumption that crop choice is exogenous, so that riskiness of the crop cultivated on a specific
plot is an adequate measure of exogenous uncertainty. But if the crop planted is chosen by
the farmer, then a result such as the one found by Allen and Lueck does not necessarily
contradict the principal-agent model. It may instead be compatible with a principal-agent
framework with joint moral hazard in effort and risk, where fixed rent contracts are indeed
associated with riskier farming techniques, such as the crop planted.
Different in flavor, the work by DeWeaver and Roumasset (2001) calibrates and simulates
a principal-agent model with moral-hazard in effort using Philippines data. They show that
the model fails to replicate the observed distribution of contracts, and hence conclude that
"the canonical theory is rejected at the 0% significance level" (page 19).
Even though the existing empirical evidence cannot conclusively refute the principal-
agent framework, doubts arise on its adequacy for describing modern agrarian economies.
One of the key aspects of the principal-agent set up is that even if landlords are hetero-
geneous and offer different contracts, these are always utility equivalent for the tenants to
their outside option, since the tenant's participation constraint is typically binding. Hence,
if in equilibrium contracts generate a surplus, this is gained exclusively by the landlords,
and tenants are left with their reservation utility. This may seem to be driven by a perfectly
57
elastic supply of tenants. However, as argued in Bell (1989), this is not enough. Even if the
supply of tenants is large compared to landlords, tenants can still have bargaining power in
sharing the surplus if their refusal can 'hurt' the landlord. If landlords have outside options
and incur an opportunity cost when meeting tenants, then a refusal can indeed be harmful
and landlords may find it profitable to raise the offer to attract the tenant. Similarly if
tenants are heterogeneous in working ability, landlords may prefer to raise the offer to avoid
refusals from more skilled tenants. In either circumstances the tenants hold bargaining
power that could help them obtain part of the surplus.
The question is therefore in which situations the asymmetric position assigned to land-
lords and tenants by the principal-agent framework is a reasonable assumption. For me-
dieval agrarian economies, such as the one studied by Ackerberg and Botticini, the relation
between landless peasants and wealthy landlords might realistically be described as ex-
ploitative; but in modern societies it may be difficult to think that contracts are imposed
on tenants. To restrict our attention to the case studied in this paper, casual evidence on the
tenancy relation in contemporary Indian villages shows that tenants seem to enter the type
of contract that best fits their personal characteristics and economic status. Sharma and
Dreze (1996) describe the tenancy relationship in the North Indian village of Palanpur as a
"partnership involving both conflict and cooperation", far from the exploitative stereotype.
Furthermore, they show that tenants and landlords have on average the same wealth and
income. Jodha (1981) finds that during the late '70s in the ICRISAT villages tenants were
usually large farmers while landowners offering their land through tenurial contracts were
operating on smaller scales, which "contradicts the conventional presumption, where the
tenant is usually thought of as a poor and small operator while the landlord is believed to
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be invariably a large farmer (p.128)." Finally four of the six ICRISAT villages studied here
were under the individual-based revenue collection system (raiyatwari) during the British
rule in India. Under such system the land revenues were collected directly from the culti-
vator of the land, who had a legal title to it. So even though tenants did not have formal
ownership rights to the land, the revenue system recognized their "actual control rights."
This supports the idea that in the ICRISAT villages studied here tenants did held economic
power during the British rule and most likely have maintained it after the Independence. 4
2.3 Testing the Principal-Agent Model
Before turning to the estimates of the structural model, we estimate the type of multinomial
reduced form logistic model used previously in the literature to test the Principal-Agent
framework. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether the lack of empirical
support for the agency theory is the result of using inappropriate measures of risk, that do
not take into account possible endogeneity of crop choice.
The crucial point is to construct two different measures of output risk for each plot.
The first measure is obtained as the output variability of the plot given its characteristics,
such as soil type and location, and it should therefore pick up the exogenous cultivation
risk inherent in the plots, regardless of the crop planted. The other measure of risk is
instead obtained as the output variability of the crop planted on a specific plot; therefore,
4In other areas, such as Bengal, the British rule imposed the zamindari or landlord-based system, where
the landlowners were in charge of revenue collection and tenants had no legal recognition. The other two
ICRISAT villages studied in this paper apparently did not belong to either of these revenue systems. They
were not directly under the British rule, but were part of the Nizam of Hyderabad's territory. We are
grateful to Lakshmi Iyer who provided these information. Banerjee and Iyer (2001) study the effect of the
land revenue systems imposed by the British rule on the contemporary agrarian performance of different
districts in India.
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it captures as well crop-related uncertainty and it is in line with the measures of risk used
in other empirical works.
The predictions of the principal-agent model tested in the empirical analysis are:
Case 1. If crop choice is exogenous, then:
a) the two measures of risk are highly correlated;
b) the incidence of the wage contract relative to share tenancy increases with risk, and
so does the incidence of share tenancy relative to fixed rent contracts, regardless of which
risk measure is used.
Case 2. If crop choice is endogenous, then:
a') the two measures of risk may not be correlated;
b') the incidence of share tenancy relative to fixed rent contracts decreases when the
crop-related risk increases, and decreases when the exogenous risk increases.
The rationale underlying these predictions is that if the crop planted is exogenously
determined, then certain crops are more likely planted on plots with specific characteristics;
hence, the two measures of risk should be correlated in response to the correlation between
plot characteristics and crops planted. Furthermore, in this case there is no role for risk-
taking behavior through crop choice by the tenant, while moral hazard in effort may be
severe. Therefore, we would expect share tenancy to be more frequently observed than
fixed rent contracts and less frequently observed than wage contracts when exogenous plot-
related risk is higher, as in the canonical principal-agent model a' la Stiglitz. As crop
planted is determined by plot characteristics, crop risk also measures an exogenous form of
uncertainty, so that we would expect to find similar relations between contract choice and
crop-related risk.
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On the other side, if crop planted is endogenous, i.e. chosen by the tenant, then the
two risk measures are not necessarily correlated. Due to moral hazard in effort we should
still observe that share tenancy is more frequently observed than fixed rent contracts on
exogenously riskier plots. But if moral hazard in risk-taking behavior is also present, due
to limited liability, then we also would expect to find fixed rent contracts to be associated
with riskier crops, while under share tenancy safer crops prevail. Hence crop-related risk
should have an independent effect (and of opposite sign) from the exogenous measure of
risk on the type of contract.
To test the predictions under Case 1, we estimate a multinomial model of contract choice
( controlling first for exogenous plot-related risk, and then for crop-related uncertainty. If the
principal-agent framework is valid then we should expect the two measures of risk to have
a positive effect on the probability of observing wage contracts relative to share tenancy,
and a negative effect on the probability of observing fixed rent contracts relative to share
tenancy. To test the predictions under Case 2, we estimate a logit model of choice between
fixed rent contracts and share tenancy where we control for exogenous risk and crop-related
uncertainty simultaneously as opposed to Case 1. If the principal-agent framework is valid
then we would expect the exogenous risk to have a negative effect on the probability of
observing fixed rent relative to share tenancy due to moral hazard in effort, and the crop-
related risk to have a positive effect due to moral hazard in risk. Results are shown in
Section 6.2.
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2.4 The Econometric Specification of the Competitive Model
In the present section we develop the structural econometric model based on the competitive
framework described in Chapter 1. The main differences are that we model one-dimensional
heterogeneity for landlords and tenants. Tenants are heterogeneous with respect to farming
ability, while landlords are heterogeneous with respect to their opportunity cost (or mon-
itoring technology); landlords with good alternative business opportunities typically have
a higher opportunity cost if they have to attend cultivation closely, or alternatively some
landlords may be particularly bad at supervising labor so that their cost is higher. Further-
more, we also account for possible moral hazard in effort devoted for the maintenance of the
plot. When agrarian contracts are for short terms, the tenant has virtually no incentives
in investing effort and resources for the maintenance of the plot, which may in turn result
in decreased fertility. Hence we assume that under share tenancy and fixed rent contracts,
the landlords incur a multitasking-moral hazard cost.
In the following we first model the output function and the utilities obtained by a generic
tenant i and a landlord j from the three different contracts, and derive the structural
multinomial models describing their individual choices. Based on the assumption that
the economy is in equilibrium, we then formulate the likelihood function. In defining the
structure of the model we keep in mind the characteristics of the Indian villages whose data
will be used for estimation; hence such a structural model might be unsuited to describe
other economies.
a) Output
Output on a plot p at time t (Ypt) is assumed to be produced by a Cobb-Douglas
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function of land (hpt), labor (fpt ) and capital (Kpt ) while plot characteristics (Zpt) enter as
shift parameters. The error term (u) is assumed to enter the output function additively and
it includes a time-independent individual effect representing the farming skills of the agent
cultivating the plot (TJ), a time effect capturing possible correlation in output across plots
due to similar weather conditions (p), and an idiosyncratic component independent across
time and individuals capturing plot specific uncertainty (v ).5
Since under a wage contract the landlord cultivates the land, while under share tenancy
and fixed rent contract the tenant manages it, input choices are made by the landlord j and
the tenant i in the respective cases. Similarly the relevant individual farming skills are the
ones of the landlord j if the plot is managed under a wage contract, and of the tenant i if
the plot is taken under fixed rent contract or share tenancy. Hence the final output under
contract c is given by
(fjpt)() (hpt )7r (KJpt)<P exp(</JZpt) +Ujpt if c= W
(fipt) () (hptr ( Kfpt) <P exp(</JZpt) +Uipt if c = S, F
(
Ujpt = TJj + Pt + Vpt
with
Uipt = TJi + Pt + Vpt
(2.1)
where W indicates the wage contract, S the share tenancy contract, and F the fixed rent
contract. All components of the error term are assumed to have zero mean. To focus
5 Additive uncertainty is important in our framework since it allows us to compare the utilities under each
contract for a given agent by using mean-variance analysis without having cumbersome expressions. Such
an assumption is also made in Laffont and Matoussi (1995).
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on tenants' heterogeneity with respect to farming skills and landlords' heterogeneity with
respect to opportunity cost, we assume that O"~j = 0, and that therefore the variance of the
individual effect is due to farming skills variation across tenants. The time effect and the
random component have variances equal to O"~ and O"~ respectively with, cov(ptVpd = o.
b) Contracts and input choices
Under the wage and the fixed rent contract, the landlord and the tenant respectively
obtain the whole output and bear the full cost of all inputs. In both cases therefore inputs
are chosen by equating their marginal product to their cost. Under share tenancy, the
tenant obtains only a portion at of the final output, and while for some inputs he bears
their full cost, the cost of other inputs is shared with the landlord. Input intensities are then
decided by equating the marginal product the tenant accrues with the portion of marginal
cost he bears. Inputs whose cost is fully borne by the tenant are typically underprovided. 6
This implies that input intensities are endogenous with respect to the contract form and
we need to obtain demand functions for each input (labor and capital) under each contract,
and use 'indirect' production functions conditional on the efficient choice of all inputs given
the contract type. However, explicitly considering the demand functions of all inputs makes
the econometric specification quite intractable. Also, while labor input is always provided
exclusively by the tenant under share tenancy, capital input may actually include some
forms of capital whose cost is shared between landlords and tenants, and some forms whose
cost is fully borne by the tenants. 7
6This result is known in the literature as the Marsballian inefficiency of share tenancy.
7 A second level of endogeneity might affect eq.(2) if agents face individual-specific input and/or output
prices. We rule out this possibility and instead assume that in a specific period t within a village all agents
face the same prices.
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To reduce the complexity of the structural form and to allow flexibility in terms of cost
sharing rules for the different forms of capital, we use the following specification of the
production function
(f~t)O' (hptt' exp(,81 Zpt) +Upt if c = TV, F
(f~t)o' (hptt' exp(,8~Zpt)+ Upt if c = S
(2.2)
which is derived from eq. (1) after substituting the contract-specific optimal demand function
for capital and where individual subscripts are omitted for simplicity. In Appendix A, we
show the relation between the parameters in eq. (1) and in eq. (2). The optimal labor demand
functions used for the remaining analysis are
(2.3)
(2.4)
b) Utilities
Landlords and tenants are risk averse. Utility functions are exponential, implying that
the absolute risk aversion coefficient is constant. Formally
(2.5)
(2.6)
where I denotes the level of income, uit(I) and Ujt(I) are the utility functions of a tenant
i and a landlord j at time t respectively, and 11 and 12 are their Arrow-Pratt measures of
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absolute risk aversion.8
We turn now to the specification of the expected utilities under each contract where the
expectation operator is denoted E. The total salary paid to the tenant for a season under
a wage contract is Wt; at is the share of output accrued to the tenant under share tenancy;
and finally Ilpt is the rent paid by the tenant under a fixed rent contract for the plot p at
time t. Such contract payments are considered exogenous by the agents when they make
their decisions as in any competitive model, but they are clearly determined endogenously in
equilibrium. However, payments are not individual-specific in the sense that if two tenants
sign the same type of contract on two plots of land with same characteristics (hpt , Zpt), then
the contract payments are equal even if the tenants have different unobservable farming
skills. Hence the wage rate, the output share and the base rent are only time-specific. To
simplify notation (and given that we actually do not observe the base rent in the data
available) we describe the model in terms of total rent paid Rpt for a plot of characteristics
For tenant i the utility value attained under each type of contract is
if c = S
if c= F
(2.7)
where the expectation is taken with respect to cpt = Pt + Vpt. Under the wage contract the
tenant simply gets his salary. Under share tenancy the tenant obtains his share of output
8Note that the coefficients of absolute risk aversion may be different for tenants and landlords hI i= (2)'
but there is no heterogeneity in attitude towards risk within the groups of tenants and landlords.
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and bears the cost of labor. Finally under the fixed rent contract he gets the total output,
bears the labor cost and pays the rent. To provide labor the tenant has two options: he can
either provide the labor himself (eventually having family members cultivating the land),
or hire workers. In both cases the marginal cost of labor is the salary rate Wt, which can be
interpreted as the value of the tenant's disutility if working himself.
We now define the utilities of a landlord j under the three arrangements. Under wage
contract and share tenancy the landlord incurs an opportunity cost in terms of foregone
earnings due to monitoring. Such cost arises because output is uncertain so that the tenant
may shirk his effort under the wage contract, or underreport output under share tenancy.
To avoid this the landlord has to supervise farming activity. 9 Furthermore under share-
cropping and fixed rent contract the tenant has to decide how to allocate time and effort
between production activity, whose return is the final output, and maintenance activity. If
tenurial contracts are signed only for one or two cropping seasons, then the tenant has no
incentive in maintaining the plot. In our villages contracts are signed for short term, so the
landlord incurs a multitasking cost under share tenancy and fixed rent contracts, that can
be interpreted as a decrease in the productive value of the plot due to lack of maintenance.
Let Mjpt = {32Zpt + J-Lj be the monitoring cost of landlord j at time t as a linear
function of the characteristics of the plot Zpt and of unobservable time-invariant personal
characteristics affecting his opportunity cost J-Lj, which is distributed across landlords with
mean zero and variance (j~. While such monitoring cost is fully incurred under a wage
9The underlying hypothesis is that labor effort is not enforceable ex-post under any contract type, in the
sense that due to uncertainty the landlord cannot condition the tenant's reward/punishment on the final
output. The landlord can reduce shirking or cheating behavior by the tenant with monitoring activity, but
cannot enforce the efficient level of input intensities under share tenancy. In the villages we study, in fact,
landlords cannot interfere with tenants' decisions under share tenancy.
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contract, the landlords bears only a portion 8 E (0, 1) of such cost under sharecropping, as
in this case he is only partly involved in farming. IO The multitasking cost M;t is assumed
to be a linear function of plot characteristics Zpt and we assume that the landlord bears it
equally under share tenancy and fixed rent contracts. 11 For a landlord j the utility value
attained under each type of contract is
V c -jt -
EUjt [(ff.,t (hptt' exp(131Zpt) + 1Ij + Opt - Wtff,;'t - MjPt] if c= W
EUjt [(1- at) ( (f~t)"' (hptt' exp(l3~Zpt) + 11, + opt) - 8Mjpt - M;'] if c = S
Ujt [Rpt - M;t] if c = F.
(2.8)
If the tenants' skills are private information, this constitutes an added source of uncertainty
for the landlord under sharecropping. Therefore the expectation is taken with respect to
cpt and rh.
2.4.1 Individual choices
In an occupational choice setting the choice of tenants and landlords between the three
contracts available can be represented as a multinomial model. The three contracts represent
the three categories of an unordered variable. Let lit and Ijt be the indicator variables
lOThis formulation is flexible enough to incorporate the phenomenon of absentee landlordism. Some
landlords have business in towns far from the villages where land is located; hence they establish their
residence in the town and leave the management of their estates to tenants under fixed rent contracts. In
our framework such landlords would have very high monitoring/opportunity cost J-Lj'
llThe multitasking cost assumed here is somewhat different from the 'land mining' hypothesis explored in
Dubois (2000). There the optimal contract choice is analyzed when cultivation intensity affects land fertility
and landlords can offer only short term contracts. In such case it is optimal for the landlord to offer share
tenancy instead of a fixed rent contract because the former mitigates the tenant's incentive to exploit the
land, implying that the exploitation cost would be higher under fixed rent contract than under share tenancy.
In our model multitasking is associated with the lack of maintenance of valuable assets related to the plot
and not soil exploitation, hence the cost is incurred by the landlord equally under the two contracts.
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representing the choice of tenant i and landlord j respectively at time t among the available
contracts {W, S, F}. Then the probability for the tenant to choose one contract over the
others is
and similarly for the landlord
(2.10)
where such probabilities are conditional on plot characteristics Zpt, the vector of contract
payments kpt = (Wt, at, Rpt), output risk a; and the individual specific unobservable charac-
teristics. For the landlords these probabilities are also conditional on the variance of the ten-
ants' skills given the pool of tenants that have chosen sharecropping a:~ = E ((TIn Ilit = S),
and the average skill level of the tenants choosing share tenancy Tj = E (Tli Ilit = S).
Given the definitions of compensating risk premium and equivalent risk premium as
formulated by Pratt (1964), we can obtain thresholds for the unobservables Tli and J.Lj such
that the inequalities in eqs.(9)-(10) are satisfied. 12
2.4.2 Equilibrium matching and the likelihood function
In equilibrium contract payments adjust so that both landlords and tenants sign the con-
tract they prefer. Hence if the economy is in equilibrium the possibility of a mismatch,
12See Appendix B for an explanation of how these results are derived and for the exact expressions obtained
for the thresholds.
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meaning that a tenant or a landlord sign a contract different from his first best, given his
characteristics, is ruled out, and the observation of a specific contract between a landlord
and a tenant 'reveals' that: a) they both prefer the observed contract to the other possi-
ble contracts, given their matching and contract payments; and b) they prefer the observed
matching to all other possible matching. Note also that landlords and tenants independently
make their choices conditional on contract payments and self-select into specific contracts
and matchings. Therefore, the probability of observing a contract on a specific plot is given
by the joint probability that the tenant and the landlord have chosen it, and due to the
structure of the model the joint probability is the product of the marginal probabilities.
The likelihood of observing plot p at time t under contract c is given by
(2.11)
See Appendix B for the expression of the likelihood function under the assumption that
both TJi and J-Lj are normally distributed. The matching process clearly generates ex-post
correlation in the characteristics of the agents matched, but as we separately model the
decision process of landlords and tenants, the structure of the matching is fully characterized
and endogeneity is not an issue.
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2.5 Data: the ICRISAT Villages
The dataset used is part of the Village Level Studies data collected by the International
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics in India (ICRISAT).l3 From mid-1975
till mid-1985 the Institute surveyed a panel of farming households in the Indian semi-arid
tropic regions in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madya Pradesh.
Two villages were surveyed for each of the five districts selected to represent the different
agro-climatic zones, but in only three districts data collection started from 1975 and covered
all schedules (or surveys). For each of these three districts (Mahbubnagar, Sholapur and
Akola) one village was followed throughout the ten years (the so called "continuous" village),
while the companion village belonging to the same district was followed only until 1978 (the
"closed" village). A total number of 240 households (40 for each village) were included in
the initial survey sample and followed for the subsequent years. Households dropping out
of the sample due to migration or death of the head of the household were replaced by a
'similar' household according to stratification within each village. Information collected is
extremely varied, ranging from household's demographic characteristics, to wealth, labor
and agricultural income, farming choices, etc.
Here analysis is restricted to the six villages in the districts of Mahbubnagar, Sholapur
and Akola. All information on plot characteristics and production activity is retrieved
from the Plot and Cultivation Summary Schedule. The ownership status of a plot is
recorded as a categorical variable. In particular a plot can be 'owner-operated', 'leased-
in' or 'sharecropped-in'. Plots who are owner-operated are not necessarily plots under a
13See Walker and Ryan (1990) (W-R henceforth) for an extensive description of data collection and
analysis.
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wage contract. Some of these plots may in fact be managed by the owner with the use
of only family labor. To distinguish between family-operated plots and plots under wage
contracts we use information contained in the Labor Utilization Schedule. Specifically we
consider a plot to be operated under a wage contract if during the cropping season the
owner hired at least one attached male laborer on a full time basis. 14
a) Uncertainty measure
Most of the empirical literature analyzing the relation between contract choice and out-
put risk uses crop yield coefficients of variation to proxy for farming uncertainty. This
procedure has two major drawbacks. First, yield coefficients of variation include variability
due to input choices, individual farming skills and idiosyncratic shocks. While the first two
sources of variation are endogenous, only the last actually represents exogenous idiosyn-
cratic farming risk,15 Second, crop yield coefficients of variation measure the output risk
of cultivating a specific crop. This is a legitimate measure of idiosyncratic risk for a given
plot only if the crop planted is exogenous, Le. determined by circumstances such as soil
characteristics and/or weather. In some agrarian economies, however, the landlord and/or
the tenant may be able to decide the combination of crops to plant, so that any measure
of risk related to the crop cultivated on a specific plot would be endogenous. Finally yield
variability is only one source of crop income risk for farmers. Barah and Binswanger (1982)
analyze the relative importance of crop price and yield variability for the ICRISAT villages,
14Hired female labor is extensively used in farming, even at full time level. In a small number of cases
female labor was the only source of hired full time labor. However we consider those plots as family-
operated and not as plots under wage contracts. The reason is that in our model wage contracts constitute
an alternative occupational choice to tenurial contracts. As in these villages landlords contract with men,
women do not face the occupational choice set we are considering.
15 Already in Allen and Lueck (1999) it is argued about the importance of separately identifying the
endogenous and the exogenous sources of variation.
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showing that indeed price variability was the dominant source of uncertainty in the irrigated
areas.
We construct our measure of risk by estimating a production function conditioning on
input choices and with a random individual effect. In this way we are able to a) purge the'
output variation due to input choices and other observable characteristics, and b) separate
the variation due to idiosyncratic farming risk from the variation due to individual skills. By
conditioning the estimates of the variance of the idiosyncratic error on plot characteristics
such as soil type, presence of irrigation devices and district location, we obtain a measure
of output risk that varies across plots, but is independent of the crops planted. The district
location dummies capture the effect on output variability of the different weather condi-
tions and rainfall variability across districts, while soil type and irrigation devices take into
account the dependence of the specific plot on rainfall. We refer to this as a measure of
ex-ante uncertainty of the plot, as opposed to the measure of ex-post uncertainty obtained
by conditioning the variance of the random error on crop choice. Clearly if there is a high
correlation between the crop planted and the characteristics of the plot, the two uncertainty
measures should be highly correlated and it should not matter for our analysis which one to
use. Finally as we consider value of nominal output, the estimated variance of the random
error includes both yield and price variability. See Appendix C for details.
b) Contract payments
To estimate the models as defined in eq.(ll) we need information about the payments
associated with the three contracts, i.e. rent payments, output shares and wages. In
particular not only do we need to know the payments associated with the contract actually
signed on a specific plot, but also the 'shadow' payments that would have prevailed had a
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different contract been signed on that plot. Given that we can observe only the payments
associated with the contracts actually chosen, we need to impute the implicit payments for
the contracts not chosen.
Rent. There are 89 plots under fixed rent contracts over all years and villages in the'
sample. We have information on the actual rents paid for only 78 plots. 16 We impute the
rents for the 11 unmatched plots and the plots observed under alternative contracts using
the predicted values from a log-linear model estimated on the observed rents. Given that
the model is specified in terms of full rent paid and not base rent, a selection problem may
arise if plots with certain unobservable characteristics are more likely to be observed under
fixed rent contracts. To correct for potential selection bias, we use a two-stage Heckman
correction model. See Appendix C for details.
Share. We fix the shares to be always 50-50. As pointed out in W-R, there is a certain
variability in the leasing conditions across and within villages. In most villages the 50-50 rule
is applied but sometimes the share for the tenant is increased during the cropping season if
the landlord fails to provide his share of seed and fertilizer costs. In some cases the tenants
have to provide most of the input and so their share can vary between 50 and 75 percent.
Recently Banerjee et al. (2000) show that until 1977 more than 80 percent of share tenancy
contracts in West Bengal implied a 50-50 rule, but after 1977 tenants' shares increased as a
result of Operation Barga, a program launched by the left-wing administration and aimed
at implementing the Land Reform Act. Unfortunately it was impossible to obtain reliable
estimates of output shares and we choose the 50-50 rule, as it is by far the most common
16The actual rents paid are recorded in the Transaction Schedule that collects information on all monetary
and kind transactions involving the sampled households.
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rule, and it is indeed the rule on which agents agree when signing the contract, though
sometimes renegotiated at a later moment. Furthermore no program was ever launched in
the study area to increase the tenants' share.
Wage. Our definition of attached laborer hired under an agrarian wage contract fits the'
description of Regular Farm Servants as defined in W-R. In the district of Mahbubnagar
and Sholapur wages for this type of workers are a combination of cash and kind payments,
while in Akola wages are only in cash. W-R documents that personal characteristics do not
influence wages in any ICRISAT village and that kind and real cash wage are substantially
the same across workers in the same village and have remained unchanged over the years.
In our dataset wages for specific workers hired are not directly available, therefore we
instrument wages with a set of village dummies.
A main limitation of our empirical analysis is the lack of personal information on agents
matched. This impedes us to control for eventual heterogeneity in risk aversion within the
groups of tenants and landlords, so that we can only estimate average coefficients of risk
aversion.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Summary statistics
In the upper panel of Table 1 we report the frequencies of each contract type by district
and village. The unit of observation is the plot. 17 There is a great variability across
17A main plot can be divided by the farmer into various subplots in order to cultivate a different crop on
each of them.
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districts and across villages within district in the incidence of share tenancy and wage
contracts. In the district of Mahbubnagar and Akola only about 10 and 21 percent of
the plots are sharecropped respectively, while most plots (about 80 percent) are operated
under wage contracts. In the district of Sholapur instead sharecropping is the most usual'
farming arrangement with 71 out of 100 plots sharecropped. In all districts only a small
percentage of plots ranging from 0.4 to 7 percent is cultivated under fixed rent contracts.
Note that in the district of Mahbubnagar farming risk should be relatively high because
rainfall is uncertain and soil is mainly red (i.e. with low moisture retaining capacity), while
in Sholapur risk is more limited as the soil has very high water retaining capacity. Hence,
these figures seems to suggest that sharecropping is indeed more widespread when farming
risk is lower contrary to the predictions of the principal-agent model.
In the second panel of Table 1 we report the average cultivated area, number of subplots,
percentage of irrigated over cultivated area, and plot value by contract type. 18 Leased and
sharecropped plots are smaller. Higgs (1973) uses plot size as a proxy for the landlord's
monitoring cost, the rationale being that the bigger the plot, the easier for the laborer to
'hide' and shirk effort, and therefore according to our model less likely should the plot be
managed under a wage contract. However our data do not support this logic.
Fixed rent and share tenancy plots are less irrigated and of lower value than wage
contract plots, suggesting the plausibility of the multitasking hypothesis on land. Landlords
may fear that under fixed rent and sharecropping contracts tenants might shirk effort on
plot maintenance given that their contracts are for short term (usually one or two cropping
18The estimated per acre value of every plot was obtained during the survey from some knowledgeable
person in the village and it was based on the plot potential sale value considering location, irrigation,
topography, etc.
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seasons). Therefore they prefer to keep more valuable plots or plots with better irrigation
devices under their control for self-cultivation.
Next we investigate whether share tenancy is inefficient in terms of input intensities.
According to the Marshallian theory, in fact, inputs whose costs are totally borne by the'
tenants under share tenancy should be underprovided as the tenants can accrue only a
portion of their marginal product; inputs whose costs are shared between the tenants and
the landlords should instead be provided efficiently. This clearly holds only under the
assumption that inputs' intensities are not enforceable by the landlord. Hence by analyzing
input intensities we can have an idea of the degree of moral hazard present in these villages.
In Table 2 we present means and standard deviations of key input-output variables by
ownership status. The unit of observation is the subplot. We include in the analysis family-
operated subplots where full time hired laborers are only women and children. These plots
constitutes more than fifty per cent of the observations. Average output per acre on subplots
under fixed rent contracts is not statistically different from the mean output value obtained
on plots which are family operated (t=1.3), while average output value under sharecropping
is significantly lower (t=8.3),19 These differences in output value cannot be explained by
systematic differences in plot quality or in crops cultivated. In fact 91 percent of the plots
under sharecropping have deep to shallow black soil, which is the most fertile, against 79
percent of family operated plots and 61 percent of fixed rent plots. FUrthermore there is
not much difference in the type of cultivated crops as in all cases cereals count for more
than fifty per cent of the production. Instead there seems to be differences in the input
19The reason why we do not directly compare fixed rent and share tenancy contracts with wage contracts
is that tenants taking up land under share tenancy or fixed rent contracts may decide to operate them at a
family level, while wage contracts seem to be used by landlords who cultivate the land more intensively.
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intensities. Labor, fertilizers, pesticides, organic manure, bullock power and machinery are
systematically undersupplied under share tenancy, while there is no significant difference in
the average use of these inputs under fixed rent contracts and in family-operated plots. 20
The use of seed seems to be lower in both fixed rent and share tenancy contracts, but the'
value of the seeds used depends on the type of crop planted. When comparing average seed
values across contracts conditioning on the crop, there is no systematic difference across all
contracts which may be explained with the practise that seeds are provided jointly by the
landlord and tenant under share tenancy.21 These findings therefore do suggest that share
tenancy is inefficient a'la Marshall.
2.6.2 Testing the principal-agent framework
In this section we investigate whether in the ICRISAT villages crop choice is endogenous,
and test the canonical predictions of the principal-agent framework.
In Table 3 we report the frequencies of crops planted by soil type. Across the different
soil types there is little variation in crops cultivated. In all cases cereals are the most
frequent crops (nearly 50 percent). Pulses are also frequently cultivated on all soil types
with the exception of deep-shallow red soil, where oilseeds count for almost 40 percent of
the crops planted. These results seem to suggest that soil characteristics affect crop choice
only marginally, while farmer's decision making may play an important role.
The first panel of Table 4 shows the average ex-ante and ex-post output variance by
20When comparing inputs' intensity between sharecropped and family operated plots, all tests of mean
equality rejected the null hypothesis at 1 percent level. When comparing the means of plots given under
fixed rent contracts and family operated ones, the null could not be rejected at 5 percent for any of the
mentioned inputs.
21This is consistent with Shaban (1987) who finds that the 'tenancy effect' for seeds is lower than for labor
and bullock.
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contract type and the correlation between the two measures. 22 First of all, if the crop planted
was exogenously determined by plot characteristics, we would expect the two measures
of risk to be highly correlated independently of the type of contract. Instead we find
that the correlation is low for plots under wage and fixed rent contracts (0.42 and 0.37
respectively), while it is very high for share tenancy plots (0.71), which suggests that the
two measures of output uncertainty are picking up different types of risk and that crop
choice is not exogenous. Secondly, we find that fixed rent plots have significantly lower
ex-ante variability than share tenancy plots (t=4.9), while plots under wage contracts are
significantly riskier than the ones under share tenancy (t=18.2). This result, related to the
exogenous uncertainty of the plots, suggests that the incidence of share tenancy with respect
to fixed rent contracts is negatively related to risk, which contradicts the main theoretical
predictions of the principal-agent framework related to moral hazard in effort. On the other
side, when looking at the average ex-post measure of uncertainty by contract type, we find
that share tenancy is associated with significantly lower crop-related output variance than
fixed rent contracts. This seems instead to support the presence of moral hazard in risk-
taking behavior by the tenant: tenants under fixed rent contracts choose combinations of
crops that are riskier, while share tenants choose more conservative techniques.
To further explore the issue of endogeneity of crop choice and presence of moral hazard
in risk, in the second panel of Table 4 we report the percentages of plots whose ex-ante and
ex-post variability is below and above the average by contract type. Though 43 percent
of wage contracts are signed on relatively less risky plots ex-ante, only 22 percent of them
22 As a single plot of land is usually subplotted and a different crop cultivated on each subplot, the ex-post
output variance for the plot is constructed as a weighted average of the ex-post variance measures for the
crops planted, with weights given by the fractions of plot area dedicated to the specific crops.
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have a relatively low measure of ex-post risk. A similar pattern applies to the plots under
fixed rent contracts, while for the sharecropped plots the majority of plots have relatively
low ex-ante and ex-post uncertainty. This suggests that in the ICRISAT villages crop risk
is an important margin in farming decision making and that farmers cultivating under wage'
and fixed rent contracts are more willing to take up risk through crop choice than share
tenants.
In order to test in a more formal way the predictions of the principal-agent model in the
case when crop is exogenous we estimate a multinomiallogit model where the dependent
variable can assume all possible outcomes, Le. wage contract, sharecropping and fixed rent
contract. The results are shown in Table 5. In column (1) we control for soil and season
dummies, cultivated area, plot value and presence of irrigation devices for possible multi-
tasking cost, and the exogenous risk related to plot characteristics; share tenancy contract
is the base. The coefficient on ex-ante risk is significant at the 1 percent confidence level
for all outcomes but, contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find that the probability
of observing share tenancy relative to fixed rent contracts decreases with risk. Wage con-
tracts are, instead, found to be more frequently observed than sharecropping when risk
increases, consistently with the Stiglitz model. In column (2) we use the same specification
but control for risk through the crop-related measure of uncertainty and again find that
risk increases the probability of observing both wage and fixed rent contracts relative to
share tenancy. Hence under the assumption that crop choice is exogenous, the data reject
the principal-agent framework.
To test the principal-agent model under the hypothesis that crop choice is endogenous
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we estimate a logit specification that controls also for risk-taking behavior by the tenant.
The dependent variable now has only two outcomes, fixed rent contract vs. share tenancy,
as only under such contracts the crop is chosen by the tenant. The point here is that we
would like to understand whether there is risk-taking behavior through crop choice, that'
would invalidate the empirical practise of using crop risk as a measure of uncertainty to test
the validity of the principal-agent model with moral hazard in effort. If such a risk-taking
behavior exists, then we would expect the crop-related measure of risk to be significant
even after controlling for exogenous risk and furthermore to have an effect on contract type
opposite in sign with respect to the exogenous risk measure. Nonetheless, as there may be a
certain degree of exogeneity in crop choice, the two measures may be sufficiently correlated
to create a problem of multicollinearity in the regression. To avoid this we use the residuals
of a regression of the ex-post over the ex-ante variance estimated on the sample including
all possible contracts. Such measure of crop risk is therefore purged of possible exogeneity
of crop choice that may exist independently of the type of contract signed on the plot, and
is instead a measure of risk purely 'chosen' by the tenant. We find that both the coefficients
on exogenous uncertainty and crop choice risk are significantly positive (at 5% and 1%
significance level respectively), which means that there is significant risk-taking behavior
by the tenant and that, even after controlling for it, the data refute the principal-agent
prediction on the relation between exogenous risk and contract choice.
Given that crop uncertainty controls for risk-taking behavior by the tenant, it also
controls for incentives on matching as described by Ackerberg and Botticini (2001). They
argue that if tenants are heterogeneous in risk aversion, then efficiency would drive less
risk-averse tenants on riskier plots under fixed rent contracts; so that the results in column
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1 could be justified by heterogeneity in tenants' characteristics. However, if heterogeneity
in tenants' risk aversion is controlled for, we should still observe that share tenancy prevails
over fixed rent contracts on riskier plots. In such framework the choice of riskier crops
would be dictated by tenants' attitude towards risk and not by limited liability. Hence, the
ex-post measure of uncertainty, purged of possible correlation with the uncertainty inherent
in the plot, should capture fairly well heterogeneity in risk aversion and control for such
incentive on matching.
2.6.3 Structural estimates
Table 6 shows the structural estimates obtained by estimating the competitive occupational
choice model using as a measure of risk the ex-ante output variance. In the second column
we report the estimates of the parameters entering the production function, while in the
fourth column we report the parameters related to the multitasking and monitoring costs
along with the coefficients of risk aversion.
The Cobb-Douglas share of labor is 0.91 while the share of land is equal to 0.005. As
shift factors we control for irrigation, district, soil, season and a time trend. The underlying
assumption is that within districts agents face the same prices for inputs and output, so that
variation in input choices is due only to plot characteristics. We control for monitoring cost
using the size of the plot as suggested by Higgs (1973), and the exogenous riskiness of the
plot. The idea is that the more uncertain the environment is, the more severe the incentive
problem may be, and therefore the higher the shirking-monitoring cost associated with
wage and share tenancy contracts. When uncertainty is low, instead, the landlord may be
able to identify ex-post the tenants' effort and therefore link his reward to the final output,
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ensuring in this way the efficient level of effort without incurring any monitoring cost. Hence
we should expect higher risk to be associated with higher monitoring cost. We find that
plot size has a significant negative effect on the monitoring cost, contrary to what expected,
while risk affects monitoring cost positively, as expected. Multitasking cost is controlled for
by plot value, soil dummies and presence of irrigation devices. Soil dummies and irrigation
devices capture the degree of maintenance necessary for the plot. If a well or a pump is
present on a plot for irrigation, then maintenance is required to keep it in good operative
conditions for future seasons. Under share tenancy and fixed rent contracts the tenant has
no incentive in devoting efforts and resources for the maintenance of the irrigation devices.
Hence, we would expect that the presence of an irrigation device increases the multitasking
cost incurred by the landlord under such contracts and, consistently with this, we find that
the coefficient on the irrigation dummy is positive and significant. The fact that the plot
value still has a significantly positive effect on the multitasking cost after controlling for soil
type and irrigation may be consistent with the fact that the market for land is very thin.
Landowners who cannot sell their 'low' quality plots and cannot cultivate them, are more
likely to rent them out either under share tenancy or under fixed rent contracts.
The estimated coefficient of absolute risk aversion is equal to 2.25 for tenants and 1.27 for
landlords; they are both significantly positive and the test on their equality is rejected at 1%
level (X~1) = 6.84), meaning that tenants are significantly more risk averse than landlords.
The coefficient on the variance of individual skills is 0.05 and is not significantly different
from zero. Such coefficient should be equal to the constant absolute risk aversion coefficient
for landlords if tenants' skills were indeed private information and constituted a source of
income uncertainty for the landlord under share tenancy. From this we can conclude that
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information on farming ability is spread within the ICRISAT villages. Finally 8 is estimated
to be equal to 0.57, meaning that under share tenancy landlords devote in monitoring about
half the time spent under wage contracts.
These results shows that both landlords and tenants are sensitive to the cultivation risk,'
and, as they are risk averse, their choice of the optimal contract is affected by risk-sharing
considerations. Moral hazard in the form of shirking and multitasking cost also plays an
important role in the landlords' decision of which contract to offer.
In order to see if our model can predict the observed 'reduced form' relation between
contract distribution and risk, Table 7 shows the actual and predicted probabilities of
each contract by district and village. 23 The predicted probabilities are fairly close to the
actual ones. In the lower panel we report the actual and predicted frequencies of each
contract when ex-post output variability is below and above the average. Even here the
predictions capture the pattern found in the data closely. More specifically the predicted
probability of observing share tenancy relative to fixed rent contracts increases with risk
while the probability of observing share tenancy relative to wage contracts decreases with
risk. Therefore our model can replicate the relation between the equilibrium distribution of
contracts and risk. This is in sharp contrast to the inability of the principal-agent model
to explain the observed pattern.
23Such predicted probabilities can be obtained by looking at the choice distribution of either the landlords
or the tenants. We report the ones obtained from the tenants' preferences. The predicted probabilities
computed from the landlords' preferences have similar patterns.
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2.7 Conclusions
The existing theoretical literature analyzes the determinants of contract choice in agrarian
economies using 'partial equilibrium' principal-agent models, where the shape of the con-
tract is unilaterally determined by only one of the contracting parties. Their predictions
regarding the relation between farming risk and incidence of share tenancy have been tested
in a number of studies and found sometimes to be at odds with empirical evidence.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we tested the predictions of agency theory
models taking into account possible endogeneity of crop choice, which was not considered
in previous studies and, therefore, may have hindered their results. Using Indian data,
we find that principal-agent models with moral hazard in effort are rejected by our data.
Second, we construct a structural econometric model based on an alternative theoretical
framework where both landlords and tenants choose the contract they prefer considering as
given the contractual terms, as in a competitive framework. The structural estimates allow
to separate the risk-sharing motive from the incentive one, and to evaluate the effect of risk
on the two sides of the market. In this way we can reassess the role of risk-sharing in contract
choice by looking at the effect of risk on the individual choices, while the observed relation
between risk and distribution of contract is seen as the aggregate result in equilibrium of
the interaction between the different agents. We find that both landlords and tenants are
risk averse, hence the risk sharing motive through contract choice exists after controlling for
moral hazard, and that the type of framework proposed is able to reproduce the empirical
relation between contracts' incidence and uncertainty as a 'reduced form' relation.
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Appendix A: Input Choices
Consider first the optimal choice of the capital input under wage contracts and fixed
rent contracts. The landlord and tenant respectively choose capital intensity equating the
marginal cost to the marginal output so that the demand for capital is
1
K;;' = (:, 'I'{e~,)9 (hp,t exp{</>Zpt))'-~ if c = W, F
where Tt is the price of capital. Substituting this expression in the production function (1)
we obtain
(AI)
If under a sharecropping contract the cost of capital is borne exclusively by the tenant,
then his demand function will be
1K~, = (~: 'I'{e~,t (hp,t exp{</>zp,)) H if c = S
and the output function becomes
(A2)
Note that the only difference between eqs. (AI) and (A2) is in the shift term which
in eq. (A2) depends on the share of output in some non linear way. Calling 0' = 1~<P'
....!e..- ....!e..-
n' = 1:<p' exp({3Z~t) = (;;) l-cp exp(¢Zpt)l~CP and exp({3'Z~t) = (~) l-cp exp(¢Zpt)~,
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then eqs.(A1)-(A2) reduce to eq.(2) in the text. Note that if there are constant returns to
scale in the specification of the production function with capital, so that 0 + 1r + 'P = 1,
then returns to scale are constant even in the restricted Cobb-Douglas specification and
0' + 1r' = 1.
Appendix B
Bl. Compensating risk premium An agent is indifferent between a contract that
gives him a with certainty and a contract that gives him b with certainty plus the realization
of a random variable c if
u(a)=Eu(b+c).
By adding and subtracting a to the RHS of the equation we get
u (a) = Eu (a + c - a + b) .
For a small variance - zero mean random variable, the above equality holds if -a + b is
the compensating risk premium, Le.
u" (a) O"~
-a+b=----
u' (a) 2
If -a +b > - :':t:? ¥then the agent prefers the risky contract as it gives him more than
what necessary to compensate him for the risk.
If both the contracts involve risky payoffs, for example a + ~ and b+ c, then we can first
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compute the equivalent risk premium for one contract
Eu(b+ 0) = u (b - (-::f:i an) = ute)
and then compute the compensating risk premium for the other
Eu (a + <;) = u (c)
utI (c) (72
-c+a= --i..
u' (c) 2
Let qI, q2 and q3 be the threshold functions for tenant i when comparing W vs. F,
s vs. Wand S vs. F respectively. Such thresholds are functions of (Zpt, kpt, (7;, e 1)
where e1 = (0', 1r', {31' (3~, "'II) represents the set of parameters entering tenants' utility. By
substituting eqs.(3)-(4) in (7) and then using mean-variance analysis, we get the following
expressions:
Similarly let PI, P2 and P3 be the threshold functions for landlord j when comparing
W vs. F, S vs. Wand S vs. F respectively, as functions of (Zpt,kpt,(7;,a~,ij,e2)where
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Substituting eqs. (3)-(4) in (8), landlords' thresholds are
2
PI = -Rpt + {33 Z pt - {32Zpt + (1 - Of) Apt - 12 ~e
(/
(3 (1) 'i"'="07 A' ( Of) A 2 ( 2-2
__3_Z _ (3 Z _ - at at pt 1 - pt _ 1 - at - _ .....:J..:l:.- 0" E 1 - at) 0"r, + a
P2 - 1 _ 8 pt 2 pt 1 _ 8 + 1 - 8 1 - 8 'TJ 1 - 8 2 + 1 - 8 1 2 2
Of
P 1 (1) 1=07 ( ) 2 -2 2
___.L'P_t - at _ _ {3 Z - at at A' _ 1 - at O"r, + O"E
P3 - 8 + 8 'TJ 2 pt + 8 pt 8 12 2
B2. The likelihood function Individual choices are given by the following expres-
sions for tenants and landlords
if c= S
Pr (V]i ~ Vi~, Vir ~ Vif) if c = W
Pr (Ijt = clZpt, kpt , 0";, a:~, Tj, J-Lj) = Pr (Vjr < Vj~, Vi~ ~ vt) if c = S (B1)
Pr (Vjr < Vif, Vi~ < Vif) if c = F
Under the assumption that both 'TJi and J-Lj are normally distributed, the contribution
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to the likelihood of plot p at time t according to the model proposed is
min(Ql,Q2) min(Pl,P2)
J dq, (17i) . J dq, (f-lj)
-00 -00
Q3 P3
£pt = Jdq, (17i) .Jdq, (f-lj) if c = S
Q2 P2
00 00
J dq, (17i) . J dq, (f-lj)
max(Ql,Q3) max(pl,P3)
ifc= W
if c= F
Appendix C: Data
Cl. Risk We model output as in eq.(l) with
(T2 + (T2 + (T2 if i = i' t = t' p - p'1J P v , ,-
(T~ + (T~ if i = i', t = t', p =1= p'
(T~ if i = i', t =1= t', p =1= p'
(T~ if i =1= i', t = t', p =1= p'.
where (T~ + (T~ represents exogenous income risk. As maximum likelihood estimation gives
inconsistent estimates of (T~ and (T~ in random effects model with both individual and time
effects, we control for the time-effect with a set of year/season dummies and estimate eq.(l)
as a random effect model with only an individual-effect under the hypothesis that both 17i
and Vpt are normally distributed with mean zero. We then obtain an estimate of (T~ as the
variance of the predicted values Pt.
To obtain the ex-ante measure of risk that varies across plots but is independent of crop
choice, we condition the estimates of (T~ on soil type, district and presence of irrigation
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devices and compute the sum of the squared predicted values Pt by cells defined in the same
way. The ex-post measure of uncertainty is instead constructed by conditioning o:~ and o:~
on crop and district, to capture the riskiness of the plot given the crop planted and the
weather conditions of the area where the plot is located.
Finally by conditioning o:~ on the village and type of contract we are able to obtain
a village-specific measure of the variance of the tenants' skill conditional on the pool of
tenants that have chosen sharecropping.
Results. Table Al shows the results when estimating eq.(I) on subplot level data. The
dependent variable is nominal output so that price variability is incorporated in the measure
of exogenous income uncertainty. Columns 2 and 3 show the estimated coefficients and the
p-values of the output equation when the variance of the random-effect Vpt is estimated
conditional on soil type, district and irrigation dummies. Columns 4 and 5 refer instead to
the specification where o:~ is estimated conditional on crop and district dummies. In both
specifications we control for season, soil, crop and district as shift factors of the production
function (results not shown). We include also a time trend to control for the enhanced
productivity due to technological change that may have occurred over the ten years. The
time trend should also capture the inflation trend common to all districts. Time-effect is
controlled for with year/season dummies, while the variance of the individual-random effect
is estimated conditional on village dummies and type of contract. The effect on output of
seeds, fertilizers, organic manure, pesticides is positive as expected, while the negative sign
of the coefficients on bullock power and machinery is unexpected. Irrigation does not have
any significant effect, maybe because irrigation devices are typically present in the areas
where rainfall is most uncertain, and they act as substitutes for natural irrigation. Testing
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for the hypothesis of constant return to scale for labor and land, the hypothesis cannot be
rejected in the first specification (X~l) = 2.6), but it is rejected in the second (X~l) = 9.4)
at 1% level.
The estimates of the individual-effect variance conditional on contract choice used in
the analysis are taken from the first specification of the production function. A test on
the restriction that the coefficients on village dummies are jointly different from zero is
rejected at 1% confidence level (X~6) = 32.4), meaning that there is significant variation in
the distributions of skills across villages.
C2. Rent payments We impute the rent payments for the plots observed under
share tenancy and wage contracts using the following selection model. Let F R;t be the
propensity for a plot p to be under a fixed rent contract at time t and F Rpt be an indicator
variable equal 1 when a fixed rent contract is observed and 0 otherwise. Then
FR:;" = <pZtpt + /;pt with FRp, = 1
unobserved if F Rpt = 0
(C1)
(C2)
where Zlpt and Z2pt are plot characteristics and Rpt is the rent; ~pt f'.J N (0, O"~) and
(pt f'.J N (0, O"~) and cov(~Pt(pt) = O"~, -=I O. Given the contract choice model proposed,
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the true selection equation is given by eq. (B1) where Bpt is replaced by the expression in
eq.(C2). Eq.(C1) can instead be considered a linearized version of the selection rule. We
prefer this formulation given the high non-linearity of eq. (B1) and the small variability in
the dichotomous variable FRpt. The number of observations under a fixed rent contract is
in fact very small relative to the number of plots under share tenancy and wage contracts
(89 vs. 2320).
Results. Table A2 presents the estimates of the selection model described in eqs.(C1)-
(C2). The specification in the first two columns controls for cultivated area, ex-ante variance
and its square, soil, district and irrigation dummies in both equations, and the identifying
restriction is on plot value, individual-effect variance, and season dummies entering only the
selection equation. 24 The exclusion of plot value from the structural equation is justified
by the fact that the other regressors included (soil type, irrigation and district) already
capture the characteristics of the plot that may affect the rent. In the selection equation,
instead, the plot value might have an independent effect as it may capture the multitasking
cost potentially incurred with fixed rent contracts: better plots might be less likely to be
given under fixed rent contracts because they might be deteriorated by the tenant and
their value may decrease. Also there is no theoretical reason why individual-effect variance
should affect the rent, while it affects the landlord's income distribution under share tenancy
and hence affects the probability of observing fixed rent contract. The soil dummies were
jointly significantly different from zero in the structural equation (X(3) = 13.9), while district
dummies were not (X(2) = 1.2) as well as the coefficients on output variance and its square
24Season dummies were originally included in the structural equation but not found jointly significant and
therefore excluded as their standard errors were high.
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(X~2) = 3.0). The coefficient on cultivated area is positive in the structural equation as
expected, and significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on the Mills ratio is not
significantly different from zero.
In columns 3 and 4 we try a more parsimonious specification, given that we have only 78
observations on which to estimate the structural equation. We exclude the output variance
and its square, and the district dummies from the structural equation; we also exclude the
square of the output risk and the individual variance from the selection equation. The main
difference with the previous specification is that the coefficient on the Mills ratio is now
positive and significantly different from zero at 10 percent level, meaning that plots which
are more likely to be under a fixed rent contract are also more likely to have a higher rent.
We use the estimates in column 3 to predict the rents that would have been paid for plots
under share tenancy and wage contracts had the parties agreed on a fixed rent contract.
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Table 1: Means of key variables by main plots
(standard deviations in parenthesis)
Wage Fixed- Share-
contract rent cro
Plots (%) 57.0 3.7 39.3
DISTRICT '\~(Village)
Mahbubnagar 82.0 73 10.1
Aurepalle 89.0 8.9 2.1
Dokur 56.1 3.8 40.1
Sholapur 28.4 OA 71.2
Shirapur 20.4 0.4 79.2
Kalman 37.4 0.4 62.6
Akola 74.5 4.7 20.8
Kanzara 75.9 5.7 18.4
Kincheda 69.0 0.7 30.3
Cultivated area (acrs) 4.04 2.74 3.38
(3.56) (1.77) (3.21)
No. subplots 1.61 1.13 1.36
(0.98) (0.42) (0.80)
Iff/cult area (%)1 0.30 0.10 0.10
(0.44) (0.30) (0.29)
Per acre plot value2 25.44 16.84 20.43
(15.75) (14.12) (13.40)
Total 1373 89 947
I Percentage of irrigated area over cultivated area
2 Plot value is in 100 Rupies.
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Table 2: Means of key variables by subplots'
(standard deviations in parenthesis)
Owner-operated
All Family Wage Fixed- Share-
o erated contract rent cro
Plot(%) 57.9 26.0 1.2 14.9
Cultivated area (acrs) 2.10 1.79 2.50 2.46 2.57
(2.25) (1.94) (2.56) (1.65) (2.63)
Output per acre (vI) 0.58 0.55 0.79 0.42 0.31
(0.95) (1.02) (0.97) (0.43) (0.51)
Labor per acre (hrs) 285.84 276.75 383.78 213.61 155.88
(433.3) (434.9) (479.4) (221.4) (292.8)
Seed per acre (vI) 0.047 0.048 0.056 0.021 0.028
(0.23) (0.29) (0.12) (0.020) (0.11)
Fertilizer per acre (vI) 0.034 0.027 0.062 0.034 0.012
(0.089) (0.083) (0.109) (0.063) (0.052)
Organic manure per acre (vI) 0.Ql5 0.Ql5 0.023 0.006 0.002
(0.064) (0.064) (0.078) (0.024) (0.021)
Pesticides per acre (vI) 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.0008
(0.025) (0.023) (0.036) (0.014) (0.010)
Bullock power per acre (hrs) 43.10 40.47 58.49 42.56 26.47
(58.03) (56.96) (68.45) (36.58) (31.47)
Bullock power (dummy) 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98
Machinery per acre (vI) 0.049 0.052 0.053 0.008 0.034
(0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.03) (0.16)
Machinery (dummy) 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.29 0.20
Irrigated (dummy) 0.26 0.24 0.37 0.10 0.12
Soil (dummy):
deep-medium black 0.53 0.51 0.57 0.53 0.53
medium-shallow black 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.08 0.38
deep-shallow red 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.38' 0.03
gravelly, saline, sandy 0.06 0.Q7 0.03 0.01 0.06
Crop (dummy):
oilseeds 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.06
cereals 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.58
fiber-crops O.ll 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.07
pulses 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.26
vegetables 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03
sugarcane 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
>1 cro 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.59 0.34
Total 8537 4946 2220 99 1272
3 Values are in 1000 Rupies.
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Table 3: Crop choice and soil type
Soil type
Crops
Oilseeds
Cereals
Fiber-crops
Pulses
Vegetables
Sugarcane
Total
Deep-medium black
6.7
53.0
15.6
14.7
8.0
2.0
100
Medium-shallow black
10.7
57.6
8.8
20.3
2.0
0.6
100
Deep-shallow red
39.1
53.3
1.1
4.1
2.4
0.0
100
Gravelly, saline and
sandy
12.8
49.2
0.2
31.8
5.6
0.4
100
Table 4: Tenancy contracts and output variance
Wage
contract
Mean variability by contract type
Fixed-
rent
Share-
crop
Ex-ante variance:
Ex-post variance:
Correlation:
0.44 0.33 0.22
(0.32) (0.17) (0.18)
0.41 0.42 0.21
(0.16) (0.10) (0.14)
0.42 0.37 0.71
Frequency of contracts by variability
Ex-ante variance:
Below mean variance
Above mean variance
Ex-post variance:
Below mean variance
Above mean variance
N.obs.
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43.12
56.88
22.51
77.49
1373
55.06
44.94
11.24
88.76
89
78.35
21.65
77.30
22.70
947
Table 5: Contract choice logistic models
Dependent variable: Contract type
(p-values in parenthesis, * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%)
Wage contract
Total area
Plot value
Irrigation device (dummy)
Ex-ante risk
Ex-post risk
Constant
Fixed rent contract
Total area
Plot value
Irrigation device (dummy)
Ex-ante risk
Ex-post risk
Constant
Ex-post risk (residuals)
(1) (2)
0.493* 0.012*
(0.00) (0.01)
0.013* 0.008**
(0.00) (0.04)
0.455* 1.016*
(0.01) (0.00)
3.199*
(0.00)
5.825*
(0.00)
-18.623* -19.621 *
(0.00) (0.00)
-0.212* -0.260*
(0.00) (0.00)
-0.036* -0.040*
(0.00) (0.00)
-0.771 -0.103
(0.14) (0.80)
3.341 *
(0.00)
6.026*
(0.00)
-17.953* -18.986*
(0.00) (0.00)
(3)
-0.208*
(0.00)
-0.028**
(0.03)
0.707
(0.26)
2.680**
(0.02)
-16.435*
(0.00)
8.251*
(0.00)
Pseudo-R2
Log-likelihood
No.Obs.
0.1982
-1563.30
2409
0.2538
-1454.89
1036
0.3764
-189.27
1036
In all specifications season and soil dummies are included.
Model (1): multinomiallogit model, share tenancy is the base, with ex-ante variance.
Model (2): multinomiallogit model, share tenancy is the base, with ex-ante variance.
Model (3): logit model for dichotomous variable equal to I if fixed rent contract is observed, equal to 0 if share tenancy is observed.
Ex-post risk variable is constructed as the residuals of a regression of ex-post output variance over ex-ante variance.
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Table 6: Structural estimates
Dependent variable: contract type
Log-likelihood:-3546.83; N. obs. 2409
(p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%)
Variables Coefficients Variables Coefficients
Production function4: Monitoring cost:
Cultivated area (share) 0.005* Cultivated area -0.063*
(0.00) (0.00)
Labor hours (share) 0.917* Ex-ante risk 2.473*
(0.00) (0.00)
f31 : Constant -1.509*(0.00)
Irrigation (dummy) 0.073*
(0.00) Multitasking cost:
Time trend 0.092*
(0.00) Plot value 0.007*
Constant
-6.314* (0.00)
(0.00) Irrigation (dummy) 0.538*
f3~ : (0.00)0.293* Deep-medium black soil -0.176
Irrigation (dummy) (0.00) (0.06)
0.086* Medium-shallow black soil -0.224*
Time trend (0.00) (0.01)
-6.392* Deep-shallow red soil -0.610*
Constant (0.00) (0.00)
Gravelly, saline, sandy 0.139
(0.13)
Preferences:
TenantCARA 2.249*
(0.00)
Landlord CARA 1.269*
(0.00)
Skill variance 0.039
(0.67)
Delta 0.575*
(0.00)
4 Village, soil and season dummies are included.
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Table 7: Actual and predicted probabilities:
(predicted probabilities in brackets)
Wage Fixed- Share-
contract rent ero
DISTRICT
(Village)
Mahbubnagar 82.0 7.9 10.1
(83.2) (7.4) (9.4)
Aurepalle 89.0 8.9 2.1
(90.2) (9.5) (0.3)
Dokur 56.1 3.8 40.1
(57.2) (0.2) (42.6)
Sholapur 28.4 0.4 71.2
(29.7) (0.3) (70.0)
Shirapur 20.4 0.4 79.2
(18.9) (0.0) (81.1)
Kalman 37.4 0.4 62.6
(36.3) (0.7) (63.0)
Akola 74.5 4.7 10.8
(78.7) (1.5) (19.8)
Kanzara 75.9 5.7 18.4
(80.4) (1.5) (18.0)
Kineheda 69.0 0.7 30.3
(71.7) (1.2) (27.1)
Ex-ante variance:
Below 42.8 3.5 53.7
(45.1) (3.2) (51.5)
Above 76.1 3.9 20.0
(73.6) (2.7) (23.7)
Total 1373 89 947
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Table At: Estimates of Cobb-Douglas production function
Dependent variable: output value (1000 Rupies)
(* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%)
Variables (1) (2)
Coefficient P-values Coefficient P-values
Cultivated area (share) 0.216* 0.00 0.235* 0.00
Labor hours (share) 0.810* 0.00 0.815* 0.00
Seed value 0.236* 0.00 0.243* 0.00
Bullock power (hrs) -0.00067* 0.00 -0.00077* 0.00
Machinery value -0.045* 0.00 -0.056* 0.00
Fertilizer value 0.306* 0.00 0.299* 0.00
Organic manure value 0.174* 0.00 0.177* 0.00
Pesticide value 0.392* 0.00 0.452* 0.00
Irrigation (dummy) -O.oI 1 0.55 0.013 0.47
Plot value 0.005** 0.04 0.005** 0.04
>1 crop -0.062* 0.00 -0.083* 0.00
Time trend 0.076* 0.00 0.072* 0.00
Constant -5.460* 0.00 -5.539* 0.00
N.obs. 8537 8537
Log-likelihood -6563.36 -6764.32
In both specification: season, soil, crop and district dummies are included; time-effect is proxied by year and season dummies;
individual effect variance is conditional on village and contract type.
Model (1): random-effect variance is conditional on soil, district and irrigation dummies.
Model (2): random-effect variance is conditional on crop and district dummies.
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Table A2: Estimates of selection model for rent payments
(two-step estimation)
Dependent variable':
(a) natural log of rent (structural eq.)
(b) fixed rent contract vs. others (selection eq.)
(o-values in parenthesis, * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%)
Variables (1) (2)
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Structural Selection Structural Selection
Cultivated area 0.392
-0.131* 0.215 -0.130*
(0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Ex-ante variance 24.702
-15.036** -0.125
(0.45) (0.04) (0.86)
Ex-ante variance"2 -6.123 6.053**
(0.63) (0.04)
Soil dummies:
Deep-medium black -2.632 0.780 -1.810 0.414
(0.20) (0.14) (0.032) (0.42)
Medium-shallow black -2.304 -0.768 -4.309** -0.061
(0.42) (0.24) (0.03) (0.90)
Deep-shallow red -6.910** 1.754* -4.403* 0.690
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17)
Irrigation (dummy)
-8.813 3.009 -3.232* -0.607
(0.24) (0.10) (0.00) (0.13)
District dummies:
Mahbubnagar 6.092 -3.271 0.127
(0.43) (0.06) (0.72)
Sholapur 9.422 -4.510* -1.215*
(0.32) (0.01) (0.00)
Plot value
-0.019* -0.018*
(0.00) (0.00)
Individual-effect variance 0.182
(0.99)
Season dummies:
Kharif 0.151 0.215
(0.74) (0.64)
Rabi 0.012 0.023
(0.97) (0.96)
Constant -8.515 4.015 -2.514 -1.233
(0.44) (0.14) (0.22) (0.11)
Mills lambda -0.953 1.l09
(0.60) (0.08)
N.obs. 78 2309 78 2309
5 Values are in 1000 Rupies.
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Chapter 3
Misinformation and Retirement
Wealth: Re-estimating the Effect
of Pension Wealth on Private
Wealth
3.1 Introduction
The basic life-cycle model of consumption predicts that, in an actuarially fair social security
system, social security wealth and private wealth are perfect substitutes. Ifpension benefits
are more generous (and hence contributions to the system are higher), then individuals
reduce savings by the exact amount of the increased contributions. Private wealth is then
offset by social security wealth in a one-to-one ratio. Extensions of the basic theoretical
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framework, that include endogenous retirement age, liquidity constraints and uncertain life
span, have shown that the substitution between the two forms of wealth may actually be
imperfect. Since the seminal work by Feldstein (1974), an impressive number of studies
have tried to test the hypothesis of perfect substitutability by focusing on the relationship
between private and social security wealth, or savings and pension contributions. Even
though the estimates of the offset effect vary substantially across studies, a common finding
is that the displacement is far from one, which seems to reject the life-cycle model.
In this chapter we identify two additional reasons that may have caused previous es-
timates of the offset effect to be biased, and develop a methodology that overcomes both
problems. First, current wealth holdings are functions of the past expectations that agents
held about their social security or pension wealth. There is evidence that individuals have
expectational errors about their retirement benefits and these are systematically related
with the true pension entitlements. 1 We show that if individuals have imperfect informa-
tion about their retirement benefits and the expectational errors are correlated with their
social security or pension wealth, then estimates of the offset effect, based on econometric
specifications where current private wealth is the dependent variable, suffer from endogene-
ity bias. Second, expectational errors about retirement benefits imply that agents have
expectational errors on the rate of return of their pension contributions. The offset effect
of contributions on savings is then a function of the internal rate of return implied by indi-
viduals, expectations on future pension wealth, and is therefore different from one even if
the system is actuarially fair. 2
lSee Bernheim (1987, 1988, 1990) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1998, 1999, 2001).
2 According to the standard definition of internal rate of return, this is the rate that equates the present
value of the contributions paid with the present value of the expected retirement benefits.
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The contribution of this chapter is to take as a starting point the empirical facts related
to the individuals' expectational errors about thier pension entitlements, and provide an
alternative econometric model that allows to test whether individuals substitute private
wealth with pension wealth in a way that is quantitatively consistent with the life-cycle hy-
pothesis, avoiding the problems incurred by the existing empirical literature. Since current
wealth depends on how agents updated in the past their expectations on social security
wealth, there is little hope to extract information on the extent of the offset effect using
current wealth and currently expected social security wealth. This suggests, however, that
current wealth can be used as a conditioning variable to control for all the information on
past expectations and consumer behavior, that the econometrician cannot observe. Saving
equations (or consumption equations) represent the optimal consumer's choice given the
retirement benefits' expectations currently held, and as such they contain the information
on what is the optimal level of wealth that the individual plans to hold before entering re-
tirement. The empirical strategy we propose is, therefore, to project the level of wealth that
the individual plans to hold at retirement by using information on his current consumption
level and planned consumption growth rate, and test for the offset hypothesis by exploiting
variability in projected wealth and expected pension wealth, controlling for past behavior
and expectations through current wealth holdings.
We adopt the proposed methodology on data from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW). We use the pooled panel components for the years 1989-91
and 1991-93 as they offer information on expected Social Security wealth, expected income
growth and variance. Furthermore our findings can be directly compared with the results
in Jappelli (1995) who uses the same data to test for perfect offset using the canonical
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specification. We find that the offset effect of Social Security wealth on private wealth is
smaller than what the life-cycle model predicts, even taking into account retirement effects,
but there is significant heterogeneity.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 we review some stylized facts on
the extent of misinformation about retirement benefits, while in Section 3 we discuss the
problem arising when wealth and saving equations are estimated to quantify the offset effect
and show how projected wealth can be used to test for the offset effect. In Section 4 we
develop the econometric model. Finally section 5 and 6 describe the data and report the
empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Knowledge about Retirement Benefits: Stylized Facts
In the last fifteen years a number of papers have documented the extent to which individuals
know about their Social Security and private pensions' entitlements at retirement. The
earliest work is by Bernheim (1988, 1990), who used the Retirement History Survey (RHS)
to retrieve information about expected retirement benefits and actual benefits received
once the individuals retired. More recently, the possibility of linking data from the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS) with Social Security records and with employer-provided
information on private pension plans has allowed Gustman and Steinmeier to document
the extent of misinformation, and to study whether informational errors are systematically
related with retirement benefits. 3 In the following we summarize some of their main findings.
• Fact 1: Misinformation about future retirement benefits is widespread. In the 1992
3See Gustman and Steinmeier (1999, 2001).
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wave of the HRS, 51 percent of the respondents report that they do not know their
future Social Security annual benefits. Among those who venture a guess, 72 percent
have an expectational error greater than $1,500 on an annual basis. Similarly, 40
percent of the individuals enrolled in a defined benefit pension plan state that they do
not know their pension value, i.e. the present value of expected benefits from the date
of expected retirement forward. Among the individuals who report their expected
pension value, 60 percent report a value which is half or twice as large as the value
computed from the provider's records. Individuals enrolled in defined contribution
pension plans seem to be more informed as only 28 percent do not know their pension
value, but again 70 percent of those who think they know their entitlements have a
severe expectational error.
• Fact 2: Misinformation is not random. In Table 1 we report tabulations from Gust-
man and Steinmeier (2001). Respondents are sorted according to the ratio of Social
Security or private pension wealth over their total wealth. In the first four columns, we
report the percentage of respondents who do not know their retirement benefits (DK),
those who underestimate their benefits by more than 25 percent of their calculated
benefits « 75%), those who overestimate them by more than 25 percent (> 125%),
and those who estimate their benefits within the 25 percent range (75 - 125%). In
columns 5-7 the percentages are computed excluding the 'Don't know' (our calcula-
tions). The upper part of the table refers to Social Security benefits, while the lower
part refers to private pensions. First of all, there is a pronounced tendency to under-
estimate retirement benefits. As noted in Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), this is a
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recent phenomenon, as in the previous decade "there was an important subgroup of
respondents who was overly optimistic about its benefits" (pag. 41). Furthermore,
misinformation is systematically related with the size of Social Security and private
pension coverage. As the ratio of Social Security wealth over total wealth increases,
the percentage of individuals who do not know their future Social Security benefits
increases significantly, implying that those who will rely more heavily on Social Secu-
rity, to support themselves over the retirement years (i.e. the lower rows), know the
least. This pattern is reversed in the case of private pension. Finally, the percentage
of individuals underestimating their private pension benefits increases substantially
as the ratio of pension wealth to total wealth increases. Among those who guess their
pension benefits, 37.6 percent underestimate their benefits and 40.4 percent overesti-
mate them when the pension wealth to total wealth ratio is below 20 percent; when
instead the pension wealth is at least 60 percent of the total wealth, the percentage
of those underestimating becomes 61.8 percent, while only 12.3 percent overestimate
their benefits. In the case of Social Security, instead, the groups with relatively higher
and lower Social Security wealth to total wealth ratio seem to have greater expecta-
tional errors, while there is no clear relation between the size of the Social Security
wealth and the sign of the expectational error.
• Fact 3: Older workers are better informed. Not only are older workers more likely to
give an estimate of their retirement benefits, but they are also more likely to have an
expectational error lower than 25 percent of the true value. Bernheim (1988) regresses
actual Social Security benefits over expected benefits and age, also controlling for var-
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ious socio-economic factors, and finds that, when approaching retirement, individuals
tend to make more accurate forecasts about their benefits. This suggests that over
time workers update their expectations and that, the closer to retirement they get,
the more informed they are, possibly due to more intense planning activity.
• Fact 4: Individuals' response to information update is consistent with economic in-
centives. When regressing the difference between actual and planned retirement age
over the expectational error on Social Security wealth, Gustman and Steinmeier find
that individuals who initially overestimate their benefits are more likely to retire later
than planned, after controlling for socio-economic characteristics. When looking at
the relation between planned anticipated retirement and expectational errors, they
also find that those who initially underestimate their benefits are more likely to stick
to their early retirement plans over a six year horizon. This suggests that individuals
adjust their plans as they gather new information on their retirement resources.
Why is misinformation so widespread? And why is it related with the Social Security
and pension coverage? To the best of our knowledge there is no theoretical model of
information acquisition in the retirement literature that explains all these empirical findings
in a unified framework. Lusardi (2001) explores the idea that gathering information on the
Social Security/pension formula and making calculations can be a costly and complicated
task. 4 The effort devoted to this task affects the quality of the information available in
every period, and the precision of the expectations. She points out that individuals may
differ substantially in their cost of acquiring and processing information, and they may
40nly recently, for example, the Social Security Administration in the US has started mailing financial
statements to the covered individuals with details about their future benefits.
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therefore decide to devote different levels of effort for such an activity. Borrowing from the
literature on hyperbolic discount, she suggests furthermore that if individuals have quasi-
hyperbolic discount rate, they may decide to postpone the acquisition of information and
retirement planning. 5 Though this type of models can explain why older workers are better
informed, it does not shed light on why misinformation is related to retirement coverage,
and more specifically why those with higher Social Security coverage are less informed, while
those with higher private pension coverage are better informed. Gustman and Steinmeier
(2001) resort to models of bounded rationality and argue that individuals expecting their
replacement rates from Social Security to be adequate according to standard rules of thumb
may 'choose' not to be informed, and are therefore more likely to correct their expectations
later. Hence, individuals with higher Social Security coverage would be less informed. On
the other side, it can be argued that some workers have higher private pension wealth
because they have made high voluntary contributions beyond what pension plans typically
require. These workers may be better informed since they have to decide the voluntary
contribution rate. Finally, optimism at macroeconomic level, or generalized fears that the
Social Security sistem may undergo unfavorable reforms, may explain why most people tend
to overestimate or underestimate their retirement benefits. Taking these empirical findings
as a starting point, in the next section we show the effect that the type of misinformation
described above has on the accumulation of private wealth and on the estimates of the offset
effect.
5See Harris and Laibson (2001) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for models formalizing the link between
hyperbolic discount and delayed actions.
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3.3 The Offset Effect and the Role of Misinformation
In this section we outline the main predictions of the life-cycle model concerning the effect
of social security and private pensions on wealth, and show the limits of previous empirical
research that seeks to estimate the offset effect through wealth or saving equations. To do
this we present a simplified life-cycle model.
Consider an individual with a finite and certain lifetime horizon T, who receives income
Yt with certainty and pays pension contributions dt every working period until the age of
exogenous retirement R. Let EtBs be the expected retirement benefits at time t when
the expectations are formed using all available information, and let EitBs be the expected
retirement benefits when the individual forms his expectations conditioning on a smaller in-
formation set than the one available. We use the subscript i to indicate that the information
set is specific of the individual. In this model with no income uncertainty and exogenous
retirement age, if the individual gathers all information about the pension system, he knows
with certainty what his retirement benefits will be at retirement; hence EtBs = B s. Sup-
pose for the time being that gathering information is costless, so that the individual is
perfectly informed, EitBs = EtBs = B s. The individual decides the consumption path by
maximizing lifetime utility subject to the following period budget constraints
At+1 = (1 + r) (At + Yt - dt - Ct) if t = 1, ... , R
(3.1)
if t = R + 1, ... , T
where Ct is period consumption. By combining the two, the following intertemporal budget
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constraint is obtained
T ( 1 ) s-1 R ( 1 ) s-1 T ( 1 ) s-1~ 1 + r Os = ~ 1 + r (Ys - ds) + 8~1 1 + r B s (3.2)
where it is assumed that at the beginning of the life-cycle the individual had zero asset hold-
ings. Under the assumption that the interest rate is equal to one and to the intertemporal
rate of substitution, the consumption sequence that maximizes lifetime utility is constant
and period consumption is equal to
(3.3)
i.e. in every period the individual consumes a portion ~ of his lifetime resources. If
the pension system is actuarially fair (or balanced), then the present value of pension
R T
contributions equates the present value of retirement benefits I: ds = I: B s , and period
8=1 8=R+l
savings and wealth accumulated up to the beginning of period t + 1 are equal to
St (3.4)
(3.5)
FUrthermore the wealth accumulated up to the beginning of the retirement period is given
R T
simply by AR+1 = (1-!}.) I: Ys - I: Bs , where the sum of future retirement benefits
s=1 s=R+l
is the value of the pension wealth. Keeping the income constant, an increase in the value of
the pension wealth (accompanied by a proportional increase in the contributions paid, so
as to leave the pension system actuarially fair) displaces in a one-to-one ratio the private
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wealth accumulated at retirement, while increased contributions perfectly displace private
savings, since consumption remains unaffected.
More complex models in the literature show that the offset effect may be different from
one. Allowing for endogenous retirement, Feldstein (1974) points out that Social Security
coverage in US may induce earlier retirement as it acts as a tax on earnings after the
standard retirement age. IT retirement is anticipated, then human wealth decreases and
this may induce agents to increase savings. 6 IT lifetime is uncertain, then Social Security
and private pensions are insurance mechanisms against the possibility of running down
private resources before death. Hence, higher expected retirement benefits reduce the need
for precautionary savings, reinforcing the substitution effect. Finally, as it is not possible
to borrow against Social Security wealth, individuals are liquidity constrained, and enter
retirement with nonnegative 'forced' savings. The resulting offset effect is in this case lower
than one.7
In order to obtain an estimate of the offset effect and test the hypothesis of full offset,
the econometric specification typically used has been of the form
Ait = aZit + {3SSWit + cit (3.6)
where Ait is private wealth or the wealth/income ratio, SSWit is the social security (or
private pension) wealth as expected by the individual i at time t, and Zit are demographic
characteristics that control for the life-cycle shape of the wealth accumulation path. 8 Vir-
6Social Security benefits are, in fact, typically lower than wages, and individuals may compensate for the
lost earnings by reducing consumption.
7See Gustman and Steinmeier (1998).
8This standard specification has been extensively used. See Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Hubbard
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tually all the existing empirical papers in the literature have tested for the complete offset
by testing the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient f3 is negative and equal to one.
A noticeable exception to the above specification and hypothesis testing is in Gale
(1998). Deriving a wealth equation similar to eq.(5), he points out that at any period
other than the retirement age the displacement effect of pension wealth on private wealth
is by construction less than one, and it is a function of the marginal propensity to consume
and of the life-cycle stage. 9 In his econometric specification he corrects the expected SSW
variable by an adjustment factor and test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient
on the adjusted variable is equal to minus one. His conclusions confirm that the offset is
significantly less than one.
A few studies have, instead, estimated the offset effect using saving equations of the
form of eq. (4), exploiting the substitutability between savings and contributions, rather
than between private wealth and social securityjpension wealth. Gale and Scholtz (1994)
obtain an estimate of the offset effect by looking at the effect of IRA enrollment on savings.
Using a utility maximizing model that incorporates the main features of IRA participation,
they point out that the offset effect of IRA on private savings depends on the rates of
return on IRA and private savings accounts, on tax rates and on the holding periods (due
to the early-withdraw penalty on IRA savings that alters the internal rate of return on
such savings), as well as on the non-IRA wealth holdings that make easier for individuals
to buffer negative income shocks without recurring to early withdraws. They indeed find
that the offset effect varies significantly across individuals.
(1986), King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) and Jappelli (1995) among others, and the more recent work by
Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) that uses the Health and Retirement Study.
gIn our example this factor is equal to -j:;.
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3.3.1 Misinformation and Wealth Equations
Suppose now that while the individual is contributing ds every working period to the sys-
tern, he forms expectations about his retirement benefits equal to EitBs =1= EtBs. This
expectational error on future benefits stems from the fact that the individual may not be
perfectly informed about the pension system so that EitBs represents his expectations given
his limited information set at time t. 10 Let us assume that the individual underestimates his
retirement benefits (EitBs < EtBs = Bs), and that individual expectations remain constant
up to the beginning of period T (with T ~ R), when he updates his information set and
corrects his expectations about retirement benefits; hence
EitBs = B~ < B s for t = 1, ... , T - 1
EitBs = Bs for t = T, ... , R.
His period consumption in any period t = 1, ... , T - 1 is given by
(3.7)
while after updating his expectations about pension benefits (t = T, ... , T ) his consumption
lOModels of hyperbolic discount would consider the precision of future expectations as an endogenous
variable that the individual decides upon trading off between the cost of acquiring better information and
the advantage of holding more precise expectations about the future.
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is equal to
or = T _ (~-1) [~(YS - ds) - T; 1 (~(YS -ds) +S~l B~) + ~(YS - ds) +8~1 BS] .
(3.8)
At age 7 the individual re-optimizes his consumption path given his remaining lifetime
resources; these are given by whatever was saved in the previous years (the first two terms
in the squared brackets of eq.(8)), plus his remaining net income and pension benefits. The
marginal propensity to consume is now T-(~-l) as the remaining life span is T - (7 - 1).
Note that consumption prior to 7 is below the level of consumption Ct as given in eq.(3)
due to underestimation of lifetime resources. After 7, instead, consumption is higher than
Ct: up to age 7 the individual has 'under-used' his true lifetime resources, and can now
afford higher consumption than an agent who always held perfect information.
What happens to wealth after information is updated? At the beginning of period t + 1
the accumulated wealth is given by
t T-l t
A~+1 = 2: (Ys - ds) - 2: C~ - L C~
s=l 8=1 8=T
(3.9)
i.e. the income received up to age t, minus the consumption till age 7 - 1 and the consump-
tion from age 7 till age t. Substituting eqs. (7)-(8) and rearranging the terms, the above
equation becomes
t t R T T
A~+l = L (Ys - ds) - T 2: (Ys - ds) - a1 (7) L B~ - Q2 (7) L B s
s=l 8=1 s=R+1 s=R+1
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(3.10)
we obtain
(3.11)
T
that reduces to eq.(5) if the agent is correctly informed since the beginning, i.e. L B~ =
s=R+l
TL B s or 7 = 1. If instead the individual underestimated his benefits in the past, then his
8=R+l
wealth is higher than what a perfectly informed agent would accumulate. Furthermore, the
later he updates his expectations about future benefits, the higher the over-accumulation
of wealth since al increases with 7.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that this over-accumulation of wealth persists even
at retirement. The intuition for this is that from age 7 the misinformed individual can
afford a higher consumption throughout his remaining lifetime; this implies that the wealth
necessary to sustain this higher consumption after retirement given his benefits' stream
{Bs};=R+l is higher than for a perfectly informed agent.
These results contribute to the stream of research that has studied the determinants
of heterogeneity in the wealth accumulation path. It has been consistently observed that
private wealth displays a significant degree of variations among seemingly observationally
equivalent households. Bernheim et al. (1997) points at various factors that may explain
such a variation within the life-cycle framework under the assumption of rational far-sighted
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agents, such as heterogeneity in time preferences, survival probabilities, income uncertainty,
planned retirement age, liquidity constraints, etc. The overall conclusion of their study is
that these factors can hardly count for the observed heterogeneity in private wealth, since
they do not seem to be relevant. The results presented above suggest that heterogeneity
in expectational errors about retirement benefits, along with different patterns of informa-
tion updating, can generate cross-sectional variation in private wealth. Following Lusardi
(2001), if individuals have hyperbolic discount and the rate differs across the population,
then individuals with higher discount rate tend to postpone planning activity about re-
tirement and have higher expectational errors, that will be corrected only very late in the
life-cycle. The sign of the expectational error determines whether these individuals accu-
mulate more or less wealth than their counterparts with observed similar socio-economic
characteristics. Individuals who have underestimated (overestimated) their benefits in the
past accumulate more (less) wealth than what the life-cycle model would predict given their
current expectations. ll
We now turn to the econometric problem arising when estimating the offset effect.
The only information usually available to the econometrician are the current expectations
on retirement benefits, while past expectations and timing of updating is unobserved. If
individuals with higher Social Security or pension wealth are more likely to underestimate
(overestimate) their benefits, and to revise their expectations later on, then the econometric
specification in (6) suffers of endogeneity bias as the currently expected pension wealth
variable would be correlated with the error term. In particular, if individuals tend to
11 Furthermore, the pension system may give different incentives to various categories of workers about
when to collect adequate information on retirement benefits. We clarify this point when describing our data
and the Italian Social Security system.
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underestimate their benefits, the estimated offset effect would be downward biased, as long
as the agents have updated their information sometime in the past. The empirical findings
laid out in Section 2 show that such a bias is likely to be present. There is indeed a systematic
relation between the size of the retirement benefits and the sign of the expectational error
(Fact 2), plus individuals update their expectations over time (Fact 3), so that current
wealth holdings are likely to reflect past expectations unknown to the researcher. One
possible way to solve this problem is by instrumenting current expectations on pension
wealth. The problem with this approach is that we would need to find instruments which
are correlated with current expectations but not with previous expectational errors nor
with the timing of information updating. This is clearly very difficult since we still lack
a testable theoretical model explaining what exactly causes misinformation, and why and
when individuals decide to update their information.
3.3.2 Misinformation and Saving Equations
The key issue in estimating wealth equations to identify the offset effect is that current
wealth is a state variable, and as such it depends on past information usually not observed
by the econometrician. It is, however, a "sufficient statistic" for both past information sets
and the economic decisions previously taken by the individual. Since agents re-optimize
in every period, flow variables such as consumption and savings are, instead, functions of
individuals' current expectations on lifetime resources and of state variables. In principle,
therefore, it should still be possible to obtain unbiased estimate of the offset effect from
saving equations. There are however some caveats.
Traditional tests of the offset hypothesis rely on the assumption of perfect information
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and no updating, so that consumption does not vary across individuals due to differences
in the pension coverage and the only cross-sectional variability left in eq. (4) is due to the
current contributions paid. In presence of imperfect knowledge, current consumption varies
cross-sectionally: individuals who underestimate their benefits, have lower consumption
until they update their information, while have higher consumption afterwards. Savings at
any given period t can be expressed as
(3.12)
IT individuals with higher pension coverage are more likely to underestimate their pension
benefits, then they over-accumulate private wealth and this leads to a positive correlation
between At and dt in eq.(12). Hence the last term in eq.(12) needs to be controlled for.
Incidentally the empirical literature controls for wealth when estimating saving equa-
tions, because it recognizes that individuals may start their life-cycle with different wealth
due to bequests, and that individual's wealth reflects a taste for savings, and therefore
unobservable characteristics. But from eq. (12) it is clear that the offset effect of current
contributions on savings is by construction different from one. Misinformation about re-
tirement benefits results in the individual's failure to recognize that the pension system
is balanced. The rate of return of the pension contributions implied by the individual's
T R
expectations on pension benefits is given by the ratio Tit = L EitBs/ L ds, which is
s=R+1 s=1
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less than one if benefits are underestimated. Substituting back in (12), we obtain
(3.13)
where the displacement effect of current contributions is equal to 1+ T?,!~;_ll)' A numerical
example helps clarify this point. Suppose that, given his information set, an individual
overestimates his benefits and believes that the internal rate of return is equal to 3, i.e.
$1 of contributions paid while working are worth $3 of pension wealth. Then, first of all
savings are reduced by $1, i.e. the amount of contributions paid in a given year. This is
the pure offset effect due to the fact that the system transfers individual's resources from
the working years to the retirement years. There is however another channel through which
contributions affect savings. Due to misinformation, for each dollar of contributions actually
paid, the individual expects to receive from the system at retirement $2 as pure transfers, i.e.
"'tit -1. This transfer constitutes additional resources that can be consumed, so that savings
are further reduced by an amount equal to the marginal propensity to consume into the
amount of the perceived future transfer. In other words, T?'!t~ll)dt represents the amount
of current consumption financed with pension wealth that the individual perceives to be
transferred to him without having contributed for. The displacement effect is therefore
greater than one if individuals tend to hold optimistic expectations about their pension
wealth, or less than one if pessimism prevails.
Gale and Scholz (1994) obtain an estimate of the substitution between IRA and non-
IRA savings by allowing the offset effect to vary with individual characteristics. As they
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implicitly assume that individuals know the rate of return on their IRA savings, and this is
constant across the sample, they do not consider the issue of heterogeneity in the 'perceived'
rate of return, and interpret the variation in the estimated offset effect as cross-sectional
heterogeneity in time discount rate or in transaction costs, in case of an asset reshuffiing.
It is still possible, however, to test for the offset hypothesis with a methodology similar
to the one used by Gale. Using a structural model as in Gale, one can construct the
adjustment factor 1 + T ~(;_11)' multiply the contribution variable by this factor and test
whether the estimated coefficient on the adjusted contribution variable is different from
one. 12 The problem with this approach, however, is that it is essential to have accurate
data on past and expected future contributions. If expectational errors are correlated with
the size of pension coverage, then Tt (and therefore the constructed adjusted contribution
variable) is correlated with {ds }~1 •
3.3.3 Misinformation and Projected Wealth at Retirement
Finally, in this section we turn to show how it is still possible to test for the offset effect by
looking at the sustitutability between private wealth and pension wealth using projected
wealth holdings in place of current wealth. Formally, let us consider again the situation
outlined in Section 3.1. The individual has accumulated wealth A~ at the beginning of period
t > T, where T is the age at which he updated his expectations about retirement benefits.
As previously seen, such wealth depends on past expectations on retirement benefits and
on the timing of information updating. His optimal planned consumption in any period
12Note that this approach should be followed even in those cases when individuals have perfect knowledge
about their retirement benefits, but the pension system is not actuarially fair and it is redistributive, in the
sense that individuals have different internal rates of return.
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s = t, ... , T is given by
(3.14)
which is equivalent to eq. (8) with the exception that we are now using beginning of period
wealth Ai to "summarize" past expectations as well as past consumption behavior. The
wealth he plans to accumulate at retirement is given by
I R R _ (t _ 1) [, R T]
AR+1 = At +~ (Ys - ds) - T _ (t _ 1) At +~ (Ys - ds) +S~l Bs .
Rearranging terms, we obtain
(3.15)
where Ct = ~=~~=g and it represents the portion of lifetime resources that the individual
plans to consume over the remaining working years. Note that eq.(15) is similar to eq.(5),
though now we take into account the effect of past expectational errors and information
updating through the wealth already accumulated up to t and that will be saved for the
retirement years, i.e. (1 - Ct) Ai. Let AR+1 = AR+1 - (1 - Ct) At; this represents a 'nor-
malized' wealth, i.e. the wealth that an individual plans to accumulate by age R + 1, being
born at age R - (t - 1) with no initial wealth. There is an obvious correspondence between
AR+1 and AR+1 in eq.(5).
From an empirical point of view, if one can obtain a measure of the private wealth
an individual plans to hold before entering retirement, then it is possible to test for the
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offset hypothesis using eq.(15) without incurring the endogeneity problem arising when
using the traditional specification of wealth equations. Even in this case, a model that
incorporates perfect offset of pension wealth on private wealth generates an offset that is by
construction different from one. However, by correcting the pension wealth variable with
the appropriate adjustment factor Ct, it is still possible to test for perfect offset. In the next
section we propose a methodology to obtain a measure of planned wealth at retirement and
compute the adjustment factor in a more general framework with income uncertainty and
isoelastic preferences.
Note that this approach exploits the role of current wealth holdings as a "sufficient
statistic." From eq.(lO), current wealth is a function of both past information sets (B~) and
the economic decisions previously taken by the individuals (al,a2). Eq.(15) shows that once
we condition on A~, then sample information on past expectational errors and information
updating is no longer required to obtain an unbiased estimate of the offset effect.
3.4 Econometric Model
In this section we describe the econometric specification used to test for perfect offset on
projected wealth. Consider an individual i with a vector of demographic characteristics
Xi. Life span is deterministic and equal to T. Let Yis be the uncertain income net of
pension contributions during the working periods. The income follows the process Yit =
Eit-1Yit + Vt + 'TJit' where Vt is a macroeconomic shock and'TJit an idiosyncratic shock. Let
{Jis } ~=t be an indicator variable for the labor status of the individual, i.e. it is equal to 0 if
the individual works in period s, and to 1 if the individual is retired. Let EitPWit ( {Jis}~=t )
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be the discounted value of the pension wealth as expected by the individual. Pension wealth
depends typically on the individual's retirement age according to the rules of the pension
system. Here we do not model explicitly a specific pension system, but simply acknowledge
that pension wealth depends on the chosen sequence of labor states.
In every period the individual decides the consumption stream and the sequence of
labor states, conditional on the information available at time t and taking into account the
economic incentives of the pension system. Formally, at time t (which also indicates the
individual's age) his optimization problem is
(3.16)
where we allow the discount rate to depend on individual characteristics and Ti is the
deterministic interest rate. We assume isoelastic utility, in particular
(C. ) = exp (Olis) C~-pXiu t8 1 X '/,s
- P i
(3.17)
The term Olis captures the way the retirement status scales within-period consumption,
while pXi represents the individual-specific coefficient of relative risk aversion. Let {EitCis , Eithsf;=t
be the solution to the above problem, Le. EitCis and Eitlis are the consumption and labor
state at time s as planned by the individual at time t given the information set of time t.
We now turn to show how to obtain i) a relation linking planned wealth at retirement and
128
expected. pension wealth, and ii) a measure of planned wealth at retirement.
Relation Between Planned Wealth at Retirement and Expected Pension
Wealth. The optimal path of consumption satisfies the following Euler Equation
(3.18)
s
By substituting recursively in the budget constraint the identity EitCis == TI (1 + E it (61n C ij )) Cit,
j=t+1
we obtain the following consumption function
(3.19)
where Cit is the marginal propensity to consume and it is a function of expected future
consumption growth rates and lifetime span, i.e. Cit = C (Eit (6 In Cis) ,T). The empirical
counterpart of this consumption function is Cit = Cit + Wit where Cit is observed consump-
tion and Wit has been interpreted in the literature as a measurement error.
Let ~t be planned retirement age based on the planned sequence of labor states. Con-
sider now the following identity: planned wealth at retirement is equal to current wealth
holding plus expected future incomes up to retirement minus expected future consumption
(3.20)
s+l _
Given that EitCis = TI (1 + Eit (61n Cij)) C t , and substituting the empirical consump-
j=t+1
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tion function, we obtain
Rit- 1 1 s-t
91 (-) Ait+92 (-) ~ (1 +rJ EitYis-
-93 (.) Eit [PWit (I4t)] - 94 (.) Wit (3.21)
where 9k (.) = 9k (Eit (6ln Cis) ,T). If this equation is estimated conditioning on current
wealth holdings and future expected incomes, then the expected pension wealth variable is
uncorrelated with the error term and no endogeneity problem arises because of past expec-
tational errors. The key problem is to obtain a measure of planned wealth at retirement,
given that is tipically not available in datasets.
Measure of Planned Wealth at Retirement. The procedure we follow to obtain
a measure of planned wealth at retirement is to 1) estimate a consumption growth equation
to obtain the predicted path for consumption, and 2) use eq.(20) to construct the variable of
interest. We estimate the following second-order linear approximation of the Euler Equation
(3.22)
since we do not have a long panel, and it is impossible to obtain accurate estimates of the
structural parameters. 6Iit+1 and (6ln Git+1)2 are endogenous variables. Since cit is an
expectational error, and given the structure of the income process, legitimate instruments
are variables dated t. For the variance of the consumption growth, we follow Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2000) and proxy it with the expected variance of income growth (}~t+l' This is
reasonable in this framework since the only source of uncertainty is income risk.
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Given the estimated parameters ~ and expectations on future variables Eit (Zis+1) =
[Eit (6.I is+1) , Eit (Xis+ 1) , Eit (0";13+1)]' we can predict the future path of expected con-
sumption growth rates Eit (EIr;:CiS+l) = f (Eit (Zis+l) ;73). Using eq.(20), planned wealth
at retirement is
(3.23)
It is important to underline that the measure of planned wealth so obtained does not
satisfy eq.(21) by definition. Ei~t) is obtained using the identity (20), that links wealth,
income and consumption, the estimated consumption growth rates and actual consumption.
Eq. (21) is instead obtained from the same identity but using the consumption function that
theoretically links current consumption to expected pension wealth. The difference between
eq. (21) and (23) is therefore that the former is true conditional on the individuals consuming
a portion of their currently expected pension wealth that is consistent with the above life-
cycle model, while the latter is based only on a accountancy identity and an estimated
intertemporal relation of consumption.
Note that the error term in eq.(21) is a function of 94 ('), which is individual specific
and it is potentially correlated with the regressors. Using the estimates of Eit (EIr;:CiS+l),
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we compute all the functions gk ('), construct the following variables
fit
-Eit [PWit (I4t)]
and estimate the following equation
Ei~t)
g4
Ait
g1
g4
g2 Eit11 (1 ~r)S-t Yis
g4 s=t
g3 Eit [PWit (~t)]
g4
(3.24)
This equation allows us to test whether individuals substitute private wealth and pension
wealth in a way that is quantitatively consistent with the life cycle model. If the life-
cycle model outlined above holds, than every individual reduces planned private wealth at
retirement by an amount equal to !& for every dollar of pension wealth. Hence the coefficientg4
Q3 should be equal to minus one.
3.5 Data
We use data drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
This dataset has been extensively used to test several life cycle theory predictions, includ-
ing the perfect offset effect. Jappelli (1995) adopts an econometric specification based on
current wealth holdings and a measure of social security wealth obtained from individual
expectations on the retirement age and the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio of expected first
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benefits' payment over expected last monthly income. He finds that the offset effect for
Italian households is about 11-16%. When instrumenting social security wealth through
legislated retirement age and replacement rate, he finds a significantly higher offset effect
(about 20%), hence concluding that endogeneity of the social security wealth variable may
be an important issue.
For this dataset it is not possible to link the observations with Social Security Ad-
ministration records, so that it is impossible to check whether the type of misinformation
documented for the US applies also for Italy. We can however speculate that this is the
case. The Italian Social Security system is unfunded and incorporates more than 50 dif-
ferent funds for different workers' categories and occupations. Even though eligibility rules
and retirement benefits varies substantially across the funds, most of them operated using
the following rule until 1992: yearly benefits are a percentage of the average yearly income
over the last working years, where the percentage is a linear function of the years of contri-
butions (up to a maximum).13 The number of years over which the average yearly income
is calculated depends on the fund, but it can be as low as 5 years. Individuals at an early
stage in their career and with riskier jobs in terms of higher income variability, may clearly
find it pointless to gather accurate information about their future retirement benefits, that
will be based in any case on future income, which can only be noisily predicted. In trading
off between the cost of acquiring information and making calculations, and the accuracy
of expectations (which cannot be very high anyway), these individuals are likely to give
up and choose to be misinformed, or make their best bet based on some rule of thumb.
13In 1992 and 1995 two major reforms took place that changed the system from an unfunded one to a fully
funded one. Since we use data for the period 1989-1991, we are concerned on how misinformation affected
the private wealth accumulation path before these reforms.
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These individuals are however likely to: 1) update their information over time as their ca-
reer settles and income volatility decreases, making it worth to become informed, 2) have
higher Social Security wealth, since there is typically a positive correlation between income
risk and future income growth, and their pension benefits are computed based on the latest
incomes. 14
This leads to think that even in Italy there may be a correlation between social security
wealth and expectational errors, and timing of information updating. Part of this endo-
geneity may have been already detected by Jappelli when he instruments social security
wealth. His finding of a significantly higher offset effect, when social security wealth is
instrumented, is consistent, in our framework, with a downward bias due to a tendency to
underestimate retirement benefits. Such a pessimistic attitude may also be behind the well
documented high saving rate of Italian households, and the existence of a precautionary
motive for saving as found in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000).
We now turn to describe how we construct some crucial variables. The strength of this
data set is that it contains subjective expectations about income growth and variance, as
well as information on the replacement ratio, that allow us to construct accurate measures
of expected future earnings and expected social security wealth.
3.5.1 Euler Equation
The SHIW is a bi-annual survey and has a panel component. We estimate the Euler
Equation pooling the panels of the waves 1989-91 and 1991-93, which means that we can
14 Apart from personal attitudes toward risk, individuals are more willing to accept a highly variable
income stream today if it is going to pay in the future in terms of higher average income.
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only observe the consumption growth rate over two years. These panels include 5,657
households. By dropping observations with inconsistent information on sex and age of the
head of household, or with missing data on employment status, expected retirement age, or
expected income variance, we remain with 3580 observations.
We estimate two versions of the Euler equation, one for non-durable consumption growth
and the other for total consumption. In both cases we control for changes in the labor status
of the household head, as well as for the spouse. We therefore construct a categorical variable
equal to 1 if the household head made the transition from work to retirement between period
t and t + 1 of our panel (i.e. over two calendar years), and zero otherwise. Since there is
no individual who made the transition from retirement to work, we do not control for such
a labor status change, which is consistent with retirement being an absorbing state in the
Italian system. For the spouse, there seems to be more variation with transitions in and out
of the labor force, not necessarily involving retirement. We therefore construct two indicator
variables, one is equal to 1 if the spouse made the transition out of the labor force and zero
if not, and the other is equal to 1 if the spouse made the transition into the labor force
and zero otherwise. The expected real interest rate is constructed by subtracting household
inflation expectations from the nominal interest rate on government bonds.
3.5.2 Wealth Equation
For the wealth equation we pool the 1989 and 1991 cross-sections, since we do not need
repeated observations. Initially we have 16,462 households. Excluding observations where
the household head was more than 45 years old, was already retired at the time of the
interview, had missing information on expected retirement age, income growth and its
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variance, we remain with 2,329 observations (1,372 for the 1989 wave, and 1957 for the
1991 wave).
In order to obtain a measure of planned wealth at retirement we need to forecast the
expected future consumption growth rates, based on the Euler equation estimates and the
future expectations on variations in family composition. To do this we use the 1993-95
panel, since the 1995 wave elicits information on family members that left the household
during the last two years. We therefore consider the pool of family members who left the
household between 1993 and 1995 because they started a new household, and regress their
age over sex and other household characteristics, such as household head education and a
dummy for the working spouse. We then use this estimates to predict the age at which
household members of our study sample are expected to leave the household, and therefore
the pattern of consumption growth rates. We then compute the factors git and Cit based on
expected retirement age.
To compute the expected present value of the future stream of household disposable
income, net of pension contributions, we use the information on the growth rate of income
as expected by the household head and its spouse, if applicable, and use it along with current
consumption and asset holdings to construct wealth at retirement. We use both current
total consumption and non-durable consumption with the respective expected consumption
growth rates predicted from the estimated Euler equations. The measure of current wealth
used includes all real assets net of financial liabilities. Finally, to test for the offset effect, we
construct the expected social security household wealth variable using the income profiles
as expected by the household and his spouse, and their expected replacement ratios.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Euler Equation Estimates
In this section we discuss the estimation results for the Euler equation. Since the change in
labor status of the household head as well as of the spouse can be correlated with income
shocks affecting the consumption growth rate, we need to instrument them. In Table 2
we present the results of the first stage regressions for a) the transition of the household
head from work to retirement, b) the transition of the spouse out of the labor force, c)
the transition of the spouse into the labor force. In all these equations we cannot use time
dummies as well as dummies related with the sector of activity since they may be picking
up macroeconomic shocks affecting also the consumption growth rate.
In the equation for the household head's transition from work to retirement, we use the
expected change in the labor status as instrument, Le. a variable equal to 1 if at time t the
head planned to be retired at t+ 1, and zero otherwise. Since this reflects expectations as of
time t, it is not correlated with the shock in the growth rate of consumption. We find that
the expected labor status change has a positive and significant effect on the actual labor
status change. Controlling for unemployment status as of time t we find that those who are
unemployed at time t are significantly more likely to retire by next period. Furthermore,
the probability of making the transition is positively related with the number of income
receivers in the family.
For the spouse's changes in labor status we use education dummies, number of income
receivers, number of family members and number of children aged less than 18 (all variables
dated t) as instruments. We find that the number of income receivers significantly increases
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the probability for the spouse to exit the labor force, while it decreases the probability to
enter the working status, after controlling for age. The number of family members, on the
other side, has a negative and significant effect on the exit probability and a positive and
significant effect on the work probability. The effects of both variables on the entry and
exit probabilities are consistent with an income effect on the spouse's leisure. The higher is
the number of family members already working (and likely the higher is the family income),
or the higher is the 'per capita' income of each family member (controlled for through the
number of family members), then the spouse is more likely to exit and less likely to entry.
We also estimated the same equations using the percentage of family members who are
income receivers and the results were confirmed. 15
Table 3 shows the results when estimating the euler equation using the growth rate of
non-durable consumption (column (a)) and of total consumption (column (b)). The house-
hold head transition from work to retirement has a negative and significant effect on the
growth rate of non-durable and total consumption, consistently with a leisure-consumption
substitution effect at retirement. On the contrary, if the spouse makes the transition into
the working status, the consumption growth rate increases, which can be interpreted in light
of an income effect on consumption. If the spouse exits the labor force, this has a negative
and significant effect on the growth rate of total consumption only, while the growth rate
of non-durable consumption is unaffected. This may be due to the fact that the spouse
decision of retiring or becoming a housewife may be taken after the household has ensured
the planned level of non-durable expenditures, while the trade off between consumption and
15We also controlled for changes in the age structure of the family members, but they were not significant
(results not shown).
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spouse's leisure is made over durable consumption goods.
Expected income variance is positively and significantly affecting the consumption growth
rate only for non-durable consumption and the coefficient is close in magnitude to the one
estimated in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2001). Finally, changes in family composition and in
the number of income receivers have also a significant and positive impact on both growth
rates.
3.6.2 Wealth Equation Estimates
In Table 4 we report the estimated coefficients of the wealth equation when projected wealth
at retirement is computed using total consumption. In column (a) we simply regress pro-
jected wealth on current asset holdings, future income and social security wealth, omitting
the constant. The coefficients on current wealth and future income are both very high and
significantly different from one, while the offset effect is equal to -0.43. This offset is signif-
icantly lower then what theory would predict, but higher than previous estimates obtained
by Jappelli. In column (b) we interact the three variables with an age dummy identifying
the younger workers aged 45-54. The estimate of the offset effect for the older workers is
-0.52, while for younger workers is significantly lower -0.17. The fact that younger workers
have a lower offset effect may be explained by precautionary attitudes: they recognize that
their information on future retirement benefits is limited and plan to consume over the
working years a portion of their social security wealth lower than what the life-cycle model
would predict, therefore carrying higher wealth into retirement. Note furthermore that
younger workers carry also higher portions of their current wealth holdings and expected
future income into retirement than older workers. This too may be explained by a precau-
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tionary motive in response not to income uncertainty (which has been considered explicitly
through the consumption growth that includes the effect of perceived income risk), but to
a more general uncertainty over future events. To explore further this idea we interaCt all
the variables with the difference between the expected retirement age of the household head
and his age. The results in column (c) show that while the expected number of years before
retirement significantly affects the offset effect (workers further away from their retirement
have a lower offset effect), it does not have an impact on the coefficients of current wealth
and future income, after controlling for age. This seems to suggest that while for the so-
cial security wealth it is the uncertainty related to the retirement benefits themselves that
matters (and therefore the time horizon over which this uncertainty is not resolved), for
current wealth and future income is uncertainty related with age independently of when
the individual plans to retire. In column (d) we report the estimates when adding the
interactions of the three main variables with a dummy equal to 1 if the household owns
the house and zero otherwise and with a dummy indicating whether the household pays
a mortgage. The presence of a mortgage has no effect, while house ownership negatively
affects the amount of current wealth and future income the household plans to carry onto
retirement. Finally in the last column we add the interaction with the number of children
present in the household, but again this affects in a positive way only the amount of current
wealth and income carried into retirement, while it does not affect the offset effect.
We repeat the analysis considering only non-durable consumption and its growth rate,
the results are shown in Table 5. The main differences are that now the coefficients on
current wealth and future income are higher, while the offset effect is lower, across all
specification; furthermore the presence of a mortgage has a significant positive effect on
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retirement wealth.
Across all specifications and independently of the definition of consumption we use, we
find that the offset effect is significantly lower than one, while the household carries over into
retirement more current wealth and future resources than what the life-cycle model predicts.
Both these facts may be consistent with a precautionary behavior towards uncertain events
beyond income risk.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we identify several problems that researchers may encounter when estimating
the offset effect of pension wealth over private wealth, if individuals make expectational
errors about their retirement benefits and these errors are correlated with their entitlements.
We propose an alternative methodology that overcomes these problems and apply it to an
Italian data set. The estimates of the offset effect we obtain are higher than what previously
found using the same data, but still are significantly below perfect substitution. We argue
that this may be due to precautionary behavior in response to uncertainty about future
benefits: individuals may be aware that their expectations may be erroneous and have,
higher private savings. This seems confirmed by the fact that for workers closer to their
expected retirement benefits the estimated offset effect is higher: these workers may be
more confident about their knowledge of the pension system and about the precision of
their expectations.
An interesting and related result concerns the way household behaves in terms of car-
rying current private wealth and future income as retirement wealth. Our estimates show
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that households have even in this case a conservative behavior, carrying more resources
than what life-cycle models would predict. Part of this over-accumulation of wealth may be
explained by the need to buy a house, or the desire to leave bequests to their children,' but
even after controlling for this factors there is a substantial unexplained over-accumulation.
Again, this can be consistent with precautionary behavior towards uncertain events.
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Table 1: Knowledge about Retirement Benefits
Expected Benefits S . IS't
Actual Benefits OCla ecun y
SS Wealth
Total Wealth
0-20%
20-40%
40-60%
>60%
Pension Wealth
Total Wealth
0-20%
20-40%
40-60%
>60%
All Sample Sample with Expected Benefits
<75% 75-125% >125% DK <75% 75-125% >125%
19.8 26.2 12.4 41.6 33.9 44.9 21.2
12.8 31.0 9.5 46.7 24.0 58.2 17.8
11.1 30.0 8.2 50.7 22.5 60.9 16.6
13.5 19.0 9.3 58.2 32.3 45.5 22.2
Expected Benefits P .
Actual Benefits enSlon
All Sample Sample with Expected Benefits
<75% 75-125% >125% DK <75% 75-125% >125%
20.7 12.1 22.3 44.9 37.6 22.0 40.4
22.7 15.9 18.4 43.0 39.8 27.9 32.3
29.0 21.3 10.7 39.1 47.6 34.9 17.5
43.9 18.4 8.7 29.1 61.8 25.9 12.3
Source: Gustman and Steinmeier (2001).
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Table 2: Instrumenting Labor Status Changes: First Stage Regressions
(a)
Dep. Var.: 6.Working Head
Expected (6.Working Head) 1.342***
(0.00)
Age .394***
(0.00)
Age2 -.003***
(0.00)
Unemployed in t 2.89***
(0.00)
Unmarried .028
(0.87)
Number of income receivers .191 ***
(0.00)
Number of family members -.088
(0.22)
Number of children (aged <18) -.028
(0.76)
Spouse Age
Spouse Age2
Observations 3580
Log likelihood -349.00
Pseudo R 2 .44
(b)
6.Spouse out
0.218***
(0.00)
-.108**
(0.03)
-.0105*
(0.10)
.013
(0.55)
.000
(0.61)
2907
-688.53
.04
(c)
6.Spouse in
-.499***
(0.00)
.099**
(0.04)
-.187***
(0.00)
.015
(0.46)
.000
(0.41)
2907
-580.91
.06
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 5% level; and *** 1% level.
P-values in parentheses, computed from robust standard errors. Constant included.
(a) We also control for education and qualification dummies (blue collar, white collar, professional, self-employed)
(b) - (c) We also control for education dummies
147
Table 3: Euler Equation
(a) (b)
Dep. Var.: 6Ln(Non-Dur. Consump) 6Ln(Tot. Consump)
Age .002*** .002***
(0.01) (0.00)
6Working Head -.248*** -.189***
(0.00) (0.01)
6Spouse out -.160 -.341 **
(0.33) (0.05)
6Spouse in .669*** .618***
(0.00) (0.00)
Expected income variance 4.259** .369
(0.03) (0.88)
Expected real interest rate -.191 -.268
(0.21) (0.11)
6Number of family members .119*** 0.111***
(0.00) (0.00)
6Number of income receivers .086*** .103***
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 3580 3580
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 5% level; and *** 1% level.
P-values in parentheses, computed from robust standard errors. Constant included.
(a) - (b) We also control for education, qualification (blue collar, white collar, professional, self-employed),
region, time dummies, and the interaction of region and time dummies.
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Table 4: Asset Equation (Total Consumption)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (f)
At 1.867*** 1.532*** 1.436*** 1.459*** 1.267***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
At*(45-54) .132*** .109*** .097** .083***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
At*(R-Age) .006
(0.45)
At*Home Owner -.135*** -.125***
(0.00) (0.00)
At*Home Owner*Mortgage .003
(0.47)
At *No. Children 0.121***
(0.00)
Income 1.294*** 1.176*** 1.154*** 1.152*** 1.103***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income* (45-54) 0.039*** .037*** .029*** .027***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income* (R-Age) .009* .013
(0.10) (0.24)
Income*Home Owner -.035*** -.036***
(0.00) (0.00)
Income*Home Owner*Mortgage .032
(0.47)
Income*No.Children .028*
(0.08)
SSW -.438*** -.527*** -.536*** -.512*** -.511***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSW*(45-54) .358*** .013
(0.00) (0.23)
SSW*(R-Age) .237*** .254*** .232***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSW*Home Owner -.027
(0.67)
SSW*Home Owner*Mortgage .347
(0.82)
SSW*No.Children 1.023
(0.74)
Observations 2329 2329 2329 2329
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 5% level; and *** 1% level.
P-values in parentheses, computed from robust standard errors.
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Table 5: Asset Equation (Non-durable Consumption)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (f)
At 1.956*** 1.765*** 1.645*** 1.468*** 1.357***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
At*(45-54) .054*** .052*** .132*** .114***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
At*(R-Age) .000
(0.73)
At*Home Owner -.458*** -.452***
(0.00) (0.00)
At*Home Owner*Mortgage .056*** .049***
(0.00) (0.00)
At*No.Children 0.348***
(0.00)
Income 1.472*** 1.263*** 1.232*** 1.214*** 1.207***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income*(45-54) 0.126*** .123*** .093*** .089***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income* (R-Age) .008
(0.30)
Income*Home Owner -.165*** -.166***
(0.00) (0.00)
Income*Home Owner*Mortgage .117*** .115***
(0.01) (0.01)
Income*No.Children .249***
(0.00)
SSW -.356*** -.489*** -.456*** -.498*** -.472***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSW*(45-54) .278*** .016
(0.00) (0.54)
SSW*(R-Age) .263*** .278*** .274***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSW*Home Owner -.148
(0.69)
SSW*Home Owner*Mortgage 1.894
(0.54)
SSW*No.Children 1.589
(0.96)
Observations 2329 2329 2329 2329
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 5% level; and *** 1% level.
P-values in parentheses, computed from robust standard errors.
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